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ARTICLES 

Equitable Defenses in Patent Law 
CHRISTA J. LASER* 
In patent law, “unenforceability” can have immense conse­
quences. At least five equitable doctrines make up the defense of 
“unenforceability” as it was codified into the Patent Act in 1952: 
laches; estoppel; unclean hands; patent misuse; and according to 
some, inequitable conduct. Yet in the seventy years since incorpora­
tion of equitable defenses into the patent statute, the Supreme Court 
has not clarified their reach. Indeed, twice in the last four years, the 
Supreme Court avoided giving complete guidance on the crucial 
questions of whether, and when, such equitable defenses are avail­
able to bar damages in cases brought at law. 
Several interpretive methods have been proposed for determin­
ing the reach of generally worded statutes like the Patent Act. Under 
a dynamic statutory interpretation, courts would be permitted to de­
velop such statutes in accordance with what the law ought to be. 
Under a traditional faithful agent approach, in contrast, courts 
would try to determine the scope as set forth by the legislature, piec­
ing together context and history to frame limited words. The scope 
of equitable defenses in patent law is an ideal proving ground be­
tween these methods, having both historical background for use in 
traditional approaches and high-stakes social questions that factor 
into a dynamic approach—what conduct do we allow patentees to 
engage in before we cut off remedies for infringement on innova­
tions that support our health and modern lifestyle? 
* The author thanks John F. Duffy, Samuel Bray, Tomas Gómez-Arostegui,
Talha Syed, Michael Risch, Dmitry Karshtedt, Mark Lemley, Dan Burk, Tim 
Holbrook, Jacob Sherkow, Jonathan Barnett, F. Scott Kieff, Michael Madison,
Eric Goldman, Sean O’Connor, Ted Sichelman, Eric Claeys, Adam Mossoff, Ber­
nard Chao, Tejas Narechania, the participants in the CPIP Edison Fellowship, and 
the participants in the 2020 Works-in-Progress IP Conference for suggestions.
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2 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1
Setting the stage of the statutory interpretive battle, this Article 
examines the historical and statutory bases of equitable limits on 
patent law, with a particular focus on the substantive equitable de­
fenses of unclean hands and patent misuse. It contrasts the history 
of equitable defenses such as estoppel, which crossed fully into
courts of law well before the merger of law and equity and the Pa­
tent Act, with equitable defenses such as laches, unclean hands, and 
misuse. This Article walks through these defenses’ pre-codification 
roots and potential statutory interpretations and presents normative 
and constitutional considerations under the competing interpretive 
conduct, arguing that it is not an equitable defense and should no 
longer result in infectious invalidity. This Article is the first to pro­
vide a comprehensive framework for the analysis of equitable de­
fenses in patent law.
approaches. It also presents a surprising approach to inequitable 
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2016, a jury awarded pharmaceutical company Merck 
$200 million in compensatory damages after finding that its com­
petitor, Gilead, infringed two of Merck’s patents directed to treat­
ments for Hepatitis C,1 which the jury determined to be valid.2 Three 
months later, the trial judge determined that Merck’s unclean hands
barred all remedies based on litigation and business misconduct, in­
cluding allegedly using illicitly obtained confidential information,
which rendered the damages verdict moot.3 The Federal Circuit af­
firmed.4 In 2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Merck & 
reach of equitable defenses, not the least of which are these: When 
Co. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.,5 leaving many open questions on the 
1 See Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231, 1233–34 (Fed. Cir.
 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019). 

2 Jury Verdict, Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., No. 13-cv-04057 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 24, 2016), ECF. No. 392. 

3 See id.; see Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., No. 13-cv-04057-BLF, 2016 

WL 3143943, at *3, 39 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2016). 

4 Gilead Scis., 888 F.3d at 1233–34. 

5 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 139 

S. Ct. 797 (2019) (No. 18-378). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
   
   
 
   
  
    
 
  
   
  
    
     
   
    
  
4 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1
should equitable doctrines bar damages, a remedy at law?6 Under 
what circumstances can courts expand the reach of statutorily incor­
porated equitable principles beyond pre-codification roots? 
The competing interpretive approaches that would answer these 
questions are in battle, with scholars and courts divided on their mer­
its.7 This is particularly true when the competing interpretive ap­
proaches are applied to close questions of the meaning of generally 
worded statutes,8 like the Patent Act of 1952. On one side of the 
battle line, Professor William Eskridge has argued for a theory of 
“dynamic statutory interpretation” under which courts determining 
the meaning of ambiguous legal texts would give weight to what a 
statute “ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present 
day society[.]”9 Dynamic interpretation is a more moderate variation
of then-Professor Guido Calabresi’s suggestion that, in an “age of 
statutes,” courts should develop statutory law as courts have devel­
oped the common law, with renovations to meet new needs.10 
Eskridge urges that, particularly when statutes are broadly worded 
or involve areas of law where there is rapid technological and legal 
change, courts should “develop that statute in accordance with con­
temporary, rather than purely historical, policy.”11 
On the other side of the interpretive battle line is the prevailing
view in American law that courts applying statutes should act as the 
faithful agents of the lawmaking body, relegating their own 
6 See id.; see Gilead Scis., 888 F.3d at 1233, 1247–48; Gilead Scis., 2016 
WL 3143943, at 39. 
7 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 23–24; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479– 
81 (1987) (disagreeing that statutes should be treated as static texts and arguing
that “statutes, like the Constitution and the common law, should be interpreted 
dynamically . . . .”); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 2 (1982); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (describing competing methods of statutory in­
terpretation and arguing in favor of a “faithful agent theory” where courts seek to 
act as servants of the legislature); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989).
8 See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1516; see also Craig Allen Nard, Legal 
Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 74–76 (2010). 
9 Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1480–81 (quoting Arthur W. Phelps, Factors
Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 456, 469 (1950)).
10 See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 2.
11 See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1517. 
 
 
 
 
 
       
  
  
      
  
  
 
   
    
 
  
   
  
  
     
 
    
  
 
 
 5 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
judgment of what the law should be.12 The choice of which of these 
two theories to use involves the inherent choice of the appropriate 
respective authority of Congress and the courts under our Constitu­
tion.13 Those that advocate for application of a traditional faithful 
agent viewpoint, therefore, argue that it better supports the constitu­
tional separation of lawmaking power into the hands of the legisla­
ture and comports with the constitutional process of bicameralism 
and presentment.14 
In patent law, normative considerations supporting the use of
traditional interpretive methods include the proposition that cer­
tainty and stability of patent law are of critical importance to pro­
tecting investment in the development and commercialization of 
technology and that codified law ideally provides more certainty 
than judge-made doctrine that can be modified from case to case.15 
On the other hand, patent law is also susceptible to the suggestion 
that it should be interpreted dynamically.16 Indeed, scholars have ar­
gued that the patent code is a “common law enabling statute,” 
whereby Congress left significant authority in the hands of the 
courts to develop the law’s contours within only broad general 
boundaries.17 Further supporting a dynamic approach, patents are 
12 See Manning, supra note 7, at 5 (“[I]t is widely assumed that federal judges
must act as Congress’s faithful agents.”); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 415 (1989)
(“According to the most prominent conception of the role of the courts in statutory 
construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature . . . . The judicial task 
is to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature.”);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: To­
ward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 
1313 (1990) (“Traditional democratic theory suggests that the court interpreting 
a statute must act as the faithful agent of the legislature’s intent.”). 
13 See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 636–37 (1996) 
[hereinafter Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference]; Jane S.
Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory In­
terpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593–94 (1995). 
14 See Manning, supra note 7, at 57–58. 
15 Infra Part III.B.
16 See Nard, supra note 8, at 53 (arguing that patent code leaves room for the
development of doctrines “emanating solely from Article III’s province”). 
17 Id.; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Fed­
eral Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 801 (2008) (stating by
analogy to Sherman Act that patent law “has always depended on common law 
elaboration . . . .”).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
   
 
 
    
 
 
 
      
  
 
  
     
 
6 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1
directed to new technologies that often co-occur with rapid societal 
change.18 
Equity, in addition to patent law, is an area of law that is often 
thought to be particularly flexible and open to arguments that judges 
should be permitted to modify the scope of equity’s rules over time
according to changes in legal and societal norms.19 However, equity 
is not limitless. Like patent law, it is framed by standards and bound­
aries in its application.20 For example, courts develop precedents 
that cabin equitable doctrines over time,21 statutes may set out which 
equitable doctrines are available under particular circumstances,22 
or statutes may codify principles of equity as developed by the 
courts.23 When a statute provides for equitable remedies or defenses, 
the boundary of which equitable doctrines apply and how flexible 
they remain depends upon how that statute incorporates those doc­
trines.24 Too little flexibility can erode the equitable nature of these
defenses.25 Yet too much flexibility can leave more than merely the
interpretation of law, but the making of law, in the hands of courts, 
which may result in unintentional or uninformed policy choices if 
the courts must rely on policy to determine the law.26 
In patent law, equitable defenses developed first through deci­
sional law, but in the mid-nineteenth century, Congress sought to 
stabilize that law through incorporation of these defenses into the
patent statute.27 Specifically, the defense of “unenforceability” as it
18 See Nard, supra note 8, at 99.
19 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 920 
(1987). 
20 See id. at 982. 
21 See id. at 932. 
22 Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 997, 1001 (2015). 
23 Id. at 1012–14. 
24 See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 
777 (1982) (quoting Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 
550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977)) (“A judge’s discretion is not boundless and must be
exercised within the applicable rules of law or equity.”). 
25 See Manning, supra note 7, at 105–06. 
26 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 424–25. 
27 See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Law, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 
(West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 170, 215– 
16 (1993).
 
 
 
   
  
  
  
 
   
   
 
   
    
 
  
 7 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
was incorporated into the Patent Act of 1952 included at least the 
equitable defenses of equitable estoppel, laches, unclean hands, and 
patent misuse.28 Yet in the 70 years since incorporation of equitable 
defenses into the patent statute, the Supreme Court has not illumi­
nated the outer limits of equitable doctrines in patent law. It denied 
certiorari in Merck & Co. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. on the issue of 
unclean hands29 and sidestepped key questions in the context of 
laches in its opinion in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First 
Quality Baby Products, LLC.30 The Court likewise has not ad­
dressed pressing aspects of the doctrine of inequitable conduct fol­
lowing modifications to the statutory text that potentially affected 
its scope.31 Significant gaps remain. Absent Supreme Court guid­
ance, accurate application of the nuanced doctrines of equitable de­
fenses in patent law requires courts to not only engage with the eq­
uities of a particular case but also to fully consider statutory history, 
doctrinal history, and the appropriateness of competing interpretive 
lenses to arrive at what the law of equitable defenses is. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief introduction to courts of 
equity, the merger of actions in law and equity, and the role of deci­
sional law at the boundaries of patent doctrines. It also provides brief 
background on the dynamic and traditional interpretive lenses that 
may be used to view the questions presented in this Article. Part II
provides an overview of the equitable defenses that were made a part 
of patent law through statute. Focusing on the substantive equitable 
defenses of unclean hands and misuse, this Part also applies possible 
frameworks for determining the scope of equitable defenses in pat­
28 See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (1952) (codified 
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 282); Federico, supra note 27, at 166 (“The patent act
of 1952 (this title) stems from two movements, one to amend the patent laws, and
the other to revise and codify the laws of the United States.”); Dawson Chem. Co. 
v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980) (“[I]n its 1952 codification of the
patent laws Congress endeavored, at least in part, to substitute statutory precepts
for the general judicial rules that had governed prior to that time.”); see also infra
Part II.A (discussing how inequitable conduct may not be an equitable defense
but instead a type of invalidity). 
29 Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019). 
30 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 966–67 (2017). 
31 Infra Part II.E.
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ent law. The first framework includes the traditional approach
whereby courts examine whether the doctrine fits within a statutory
provision, such as the unenforceability defense available under sec­
tion 282 of the Patent Act,32 determine whether terms in the statute
had an established meaning in decisional law, and then assess 
whether expansion of the doctrine exceeds the scope of decisional 
law as it was imputed into the statute. The second alternative frame­
work includes the dynamic approach whereby courts view the stat­
utory codification of equitable defenses as common law enabling, 
and thereby, they look to decisional law, including law after enact­
ment, the equities of each particular case, and societal and legal 
norms in place at the time the case is decided.
Part III explores the constitutional considerations inherent in ap­
plication of the competing interpretive methods and conducts a nor­
mative analysis of the role of courts versus the role of Congress in 
determining the boundaries of equitable principles in patent law. 
This Part discusses the authority of courts to make determinations
about the boundaries of equity after a codification event. It compares 
the institutional advantages of courts versus Congress to set the 
boundaries and policies of equitable defenses in patent law, given 
these institutions’ structures, typical functioning, and ability to 
gather information necessary to efficiently make policy choices.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND INTERPRETIVE LENSES
A. A Brief History of Equity 
1. THE MERGER OF COURTS OF EQUITY AND LAW
From at least approximately the fourteenth century, the English 
judicial system was divided into separate courts and procedures for 
law and equity.33 The “common law” or “law” courts were charac­
terized by use of a jury, a formalized pleading system, and 
32 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (1952) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 282).
33 See William F. Walsh, Equity Prior to the Chancellor’s Court, 17 GEO. 
L.J. 97, 105 (1929); Subrin, supra note 19, at 914 n.23 (1987) (noting that other
courts, in addition to courts of law and equity, were also available).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
        
     
 
 
         
 
  
 
  
 9 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
development of precedent.34 Common law courts required plaintiffs
to cabin their legal dispute into pleading a cause of action from 
among those commonly used in prior writs.35 Over time, precedent 
developed indicating which facts were sufficient for specific causes
of action and procedure developed for resolving cases on the plead­
ings where there were no disputes of fact.36 The courts of law 
awarded monetary compensation or actual damages as a remedy.37 
The court of equity, by contrast, began as written requests to the 
Chancellor to relieve parties from application of the common law in
exceptional cases.38 Indeed, the court of equity was not available to 
parties who could obtain an adequate remedy at law.39 In its original
form, the outcome of a petition to the Chancellor depended primar­
ily on the Chancellor’s conscience, such that outcomes often varied 
in similar cases.40 In proceedings in the court of equity, the Chan­
cellor could order the defendant to answer questions under oath (in 
what was a precursor to modern discovery procedures) and would 
weigh the case with considerations of fairness, the totality of the cir­
cumstances between the parties, and the impact on the parties and
the public.41 The court of equity had power to order specific relief 
as the Chancellor decided was appropriate to stop future harm and
34 Subrin, supra note 19, at 914. 
35 See id. at 915. 
36 See id. For example, if the parties did not contest the facts but only con­
tested legal issues, either side could demur, filing what is today a motion to dis­
miss or for judgment on the pleadings, whereas if a party successfully traversed, 
or showed that there were disputed factual issues that could permit recovery, the
case would proceed to a jury. Id. at 916.
37 See id. at 919. 
38 Id. at 918; see Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486; 1 Ch.
Rep. 1, 7 (noting role of equity is “to soften and mollify the Extremity of the
Law . . . .”).
39 Subrin, supra note 19, at 920. 
40 See PAUL S. DAVIES & GRAHAM VIRGO, EQUITY & TRUSTS: TEXT, CASES,
AND MATERIALS 4 (1st ed. 2013) (discussing history of equity jurisprudence, not­
ing that in early years of equity “ultimately, the intervention of the Lord Chancel­
lor depended upon the exercise of the Lord Chancellor’s own conscience. This
inherently discretionary approach meant that it was difficult to predict the out­
come of any petition to the Lord Chancellor.”). 
41 See Subrin, supra note 19, at 919.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
   
 
    
 
   
 
   
  
  
  
 
   
  
  
 
  
 
   
  
  
   
  
    
  
    
 
10 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1
account for gains from the wrongdoing, such as the relief of an in­
junction or an accounting of profits.42 
At the time of the founding of the United States, American fed­
eral courts were modeled after this split English system.43 The Con­
stitution granted the federal courts the power to hear cases “in law
and equity.”44 The federal courts of law and equity were not physi­
cally separate, but plaintiffs were required to choose whether to pre­
sent their cases in either the equity side of the court by a bill in equity
or in the law side of the court, which operated under separate proce­
dures.45 Like in English law, the American court of law was charac­
terized by use of a jury to decide factual issues and the potential for 
recovery of monetary damages suffered by the aggrieved party.46 
42 See id.
43 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 48 (Jarius W. Perry ed., 12th ed.
1877); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78
WASH. L. REV. 429, 449 (2003) (“[E]arly American courts were modeling the 
English method of complementary systems of law and equity.”); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is true that the separation of the equity from the 
legal jurisdiction is peculiar to the English system of jurisprudence; which is the 
model that has been followed in several of the states.”). 
44 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
45 See Main, supra note 43, at 450 (“Although Congress did not create a sep­
arate court of equity in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it contemplated that the federal 
court system would administer law and equity on different ‘sides’ of the court and
by different procedures.”); Gustavus Ohlinger, Problems of Jurisdiction and 
Venue and of the Right of Trial by Jury Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 240, 255 (1941) (“The temple of federal justice was orig­
inally constructed with a partition extending from the foundation to the roof. On 
one side was a chamber labelled ‘law’ and on the other side a chamber marked
‘equity.’ There was no opening in the partition and not even the most astute lawyer 
could penetrate it. If he found himself in the wrong chamber his case was dis­
missed, he was compelled to make his exit, and then from the outside enter the 
proper chamber.”); see also Charles T. McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Eq­
uity in United States Courts, 6 N.C. L. REV. 283, 284 (1928) (noting that these
cases were presented in different sides of the same court, sometimes to same judge 
playing a different role); Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. 
L. REV. 217, 231 (2018) (describing debates around the Judiciary Article’s inclu­
sion of equity jurisdiction, noting that some objected to vesting equity power in
same federal courts that would hear cases at law). 
46 See John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A 
Study of Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1967) (noting 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
    
 
     
   
  
 
  
  
 
   
   
 
 
  
   
    
  
 
 
 11 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
Also, like in English courts, the court of equity could grant relief, 
including injunctions to cease behavior or restitution to account for 
wrongful gains.47 The court of equity was not available where an
adequate remedy could be obtained from the court of law.48 Federal 
courts in their infancy adopted the equity precedent of the English 
High Court of Chancery as their own.49 
Nevertheless, after about 150 years of use in the United States, 
the procedures for these separate systems were gradually merged to­
gether.50 In a key step toward merger in 1915, Congress passed the 
Law and Equity Act, which permitted equitable defenses to be pled 
in actions at law; this is contrary to the previous practice that re­
quired a separate bill in equity to be filed to try to enjoin the suit at 
law from continuing.51 However, this statute did not provide that all 
equitable defenses would become defenses that, if shown, would bar 
causes of action at law—the Law and Equity Act merely effected a 
procedural change, not a substantive one.52 Indeed, the Supreme 
that “jury trial as of right was confined to actions at law”); see also Mark Lemley, 
Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2013)
(indicating that in early common law monetary damages were only available in 
courts sitting in law). 
47 See Morley, supra note 45, at 228–29, 236–37 (noting that early American
courts sitting in equity applied English equity procedures). 
48 Id. at 232 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 116, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789) 
(“‘[S]uits in equity shall not be sustained in . . . courts of the United States, in any 
case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.’”).
49 See Main, supra note 43, at 450. 
50 See Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 956, ch. 90 § 274(b). 
51 Id. (“That in all actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by 
answer, plea, or replication without the necessity of filing a bill on the equity side
of the court.”); see Walter Wheeler Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645, 
650 (1922–1923). But see E.W. Hinton, Equitable Defenses Under Modern 
Codes, 18 MICH. L. REV. 717, 720–21 (1920) (urging that equitable defenses 
should be called legal defenses if they apply to bar actions at law after merger).
For historical clarity, and because historical clarity is necessary to properly apply 
these defenses in patent law, this Article uses the term “equitable defense” if the 
defense originated in a court of equity, even if the defense eventually equally
barred a remedy in law or equity. 
52 See Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat’l. Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922); see
also Clarksburg Tr. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins., 40 F.2d 626, 633 (4th Cir. 1930)
(“While this statute does not abolish the distinction between actions at law and 
suits in equity, there can be no question that its purpose was to end the unseemly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
     
   
  
    
 
 
 
  
  
    
         
  
 
    
   
  
   
     
  
  
  
 
12 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1
Court stated shortly after the Act was passed that “[w]hat was an
action at law before the Code is still an action founded on legal prin­
ciples; and what was a bill in equity before the Code is still a civil 
action founded on principles of equity.”53 Equitable defenses that 
were not available to bar legal claims, such as injunctions to stop the 
action at law from proceeding or cancellations of the right that 
formed the basis for the legal cause of action, could not be inter­
posed as equitable defenses to legal claims.54 
In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished separate 
actions in law and equity and, instead, provided for “one form of 
action to be known as ‘the civil action,’” where law and equity 
would be pled together in a single, simplified form of pleading.55 
practice of turning a litigant out of court because he had come in at the wrong 
door.”); cf. Martin v. Smith, 65 A. 257, 259 (Me. 1906) (interpreting a similar
state statute adopted in Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ch. 84, § 17 (1903)) to determine 
that reformation of a mortgage document based on mutual mistake could not be
interposed in an action at law). 
53 Liberty Oil, 260 U.S. at 242 (internal citations omitted); see also Charles 
W. Joiner & Ray A. Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity, 55 MICH. L. REV. 
1059, 1077 (1957) (“The statute provides no new defenses, but rather provides a
new way of obtaining equitable relief by the device of a cross-action.”).
54 See Liberty Oil, 260 U.S. at 242–43 (“If a defendant at law had an equitable
defense, he resorted to a bill in equity to enjoin the suit at law, until he could make
his equitable defense effective by a hearing before the chancellor. The hearing on
that bill was before the chancellor and not before a jury, and, if the prayer of the 
bill was granted, the injunction against the suit at law was made perpetual and no
jury trial ensued. If the injunction was denied, the suit at law proceeded to verdict
and judgment.”); cf. Martin, 65 A. at 259.
55 See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (amended 2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 advisory
committee’s note to 1938 amendment (“This rule follows in substance the usual 
introductory statements to code practices which provide for a single action and 
mode of procedure, with abolition of forms of action and procedural distinc­
tions.”); Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L.
REV. 261, 262–63 (1939). States also gradually began to merge courts of law and
equity around the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, beginning with New 
York in 1846. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 5, 8 (1846), reprinted in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 95, 124 (Robert C. Cumming et al. 
eds., Albany, James B. Lyon 1894) (abolishing New York’s separate courts of 
chancery and beginning transfer of cases arising in equity to courts with jurisdic­
tion in both law and equity). The New York Field Code of 1848 then merged legal
and equitable forms of pleading into a simplified, combined form of pleading both 
legal and equitable claims for relief. See THE CODE OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
   
  
  
  
 
  
       
 
    
       
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
   
 
 13 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
However, these rules, like the 1915 Act, only altered procedure and 
did not substantively join law and equity.56 Equitable defenses that 
would have been insufficient to enjoin a suit at law if filed as a sep­
arate bill in equity remained unavailable to bar legal claims in the
combined systems after both the Law and Equity Act of 1915 and 
the federal merger of legal and equitable pleading in 1938.57 It is
true that in some areas of law, like contracts, equitable defenses fre­
quently came to be used to bar legal claims after the merger.58 How­
ever, this is not because the merger made equitable defenses newly
and completely available to legal claims; it is because, in contract 
law, requests for equitable relief that would have the effect of nulli­
fying the claim at law were frequently available by a plea in equity
to bar enforcement at law prior to the merger.59 For example, an ac­
tion to reform a contract due to mutual mistake in its execution was 
an action available in equity, and its effect could be used to under­
mine the basis for asserting breach of the contract at law.60 A number 
OF NEW YORK 65 (New York, John S. Voorhies 2d ed. 1852); Mildred V. Coe & 
Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field
Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 239–40 (1942); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley 
Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 
6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 316 (1988). Most other states soon followed. See Sam­
uel L. Bray, supra note 22, at 1018 n.113 (2015) (noting that Delaware, Missis­
sippi, Tennessee, New Jersey, Cook County, Illinois, Georgia, and Iowa retained
limited, separate procedures or courts for actions in equity). 
56 Joiner & Geddes, supra note 53, at 1088 (“[M]erger does not affect sub­
stantive law.”); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949)
(“Notwithstanding the [procedural] fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the substantive principles of Courts of Chancery remain unaffected.”). 
57 See William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 489
(1938) (“Equitable defenses do not become legal defenses under code mer­
ger . . . .”); Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16
(1985) (noting in dicta “that application of the equitable defense of laches in an 
action at law would be novel indeed . . . .”).
58 Bray, supra note 22, at 999 (“In many areas of the law, such as contracts, 
the defenses that were available at law and those available in equity have been
assimilated.”). 
59 See Clarksburg Tr. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 40 F.2d 626, 632 (4th 
Cir. 1930); see also Cook, supra note 51, at 650 (collecting cases where equitable 
cross-actions were available to enjoin suits at law). 
60 See Clarksburg Tr. Co., 40 F.2d at 632 (“[W]e regard it as well settled that,
where parties have agreed upon a contract, but in reducing it to writing fail to 
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of other originally equitable principles were incorporated as de­
fenses at law prior to merger, including the doctrine of equitable es­
toppel.61 
Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court cases, discussed in more de­
tail below, leave open how the distinction between law and equity
has carried into the modern day in patent cases.62 
2. 	 THE UNIQUE COURSE OF EQUITY PROCEDURE IN PATENT 
LAW BY STATUTE
Even prior to the federal merger of all pleadings in law and eq­
uity in 1938,63 law and equity charted a unique course in patent 
cases. Through the Patent Act of 1870, Congress granted courts sit­
ting in equity the power to award the patentee’s actual damages in
patent cases, in addition to the equitable remedies of injunction and 
accounting or restitution,64 and to increase the award of damages in 
its discretion: 
embody it in the written instrument through mutual mistake, equity will reform 
the instrument as written to make it conform to their true agreement.”); see also
James Barr Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defences, 9 HARV. L. REV. 
49, 51 (1895-1896) (discussing role of equity in contract law, noting “from very 
early times, equity would grant a permanent unconditional injunction against an 
action [at law] upon a specialty [contract] got by fraud . . . .”).
61 See Hinton, supra note 51, at 721 (“Formerly, a defendant, when sued at 
law, had no defense on the ground of equitable estoppel, but was forced into eq­
uity for an injunction to restrain the prosecution of the action. In the course of 
time, however, in spite of theoretical objections and practical difficulties, equita­
ble estoppels became generally recognized as defenses at law . . . .”). 
62 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 961 (2017); Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 
678 (2014).
63 See supra note 55 and accompanying text; Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure Merge Equity and Common Law, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/his­
tory/timeline/federal-rules-civil-procedure-merge-equity-and-common-law (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2020).
64 This equitable remedy of an accounting of the infringer’s profits is no
longer available; in 1946 Congress passed an amendment to the patent act that 
limited monetary recovery to “damages” to the patentee resulting from the in­
fringement. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (1946) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946)) (current version available at 35 U.S.C. § 284); 
see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505– 
06 (1964) (explaining history and purpose of statutory change that eliminated an
accounting of infringer’s profits as a damages remedy). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
    
   
  
 
  
 15 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
[T]he court shall have power, upon bill in equity filed 
by any party aggrieved, to grant injunctions accord­
ing to the course and principles of courts of equity,
to prevent the violation of any right secured by pat­
ent, on such terms as the court may deem reasonable; 
and upon a decree being rendered in any such case 
for an infringement, the claimant [complainant] shall 
be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be 
accounted for by the defendant, the damages the 
complainant has sustained thereby, and the court 
shall assess the same or cause the same to be assessed 
under its direction, and the court shall have the same 
powers to increase the same in its discretion that are
given by this act to increase the damages found by 
verdicts in actions upon the case . . . .65 
Therefore, rather than bringing separate actions in law to recover 
damages and in equity to obtain an injunction and other equitable 
relief, patentees could obtain both remedies from the same action if 
they sued in equity.66 However, the Patent Act of 1870 did not sim­
ilarly grant courts in actions at law the ability to award equitable 
remedies.67 As a result, many patent actions from 1870 until at least 
the federal merger of legal and equitable pleading in 1938 were
brought in courts of equity.68 
65 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206.
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 457, 470 (1938) (“After 1870 patentees resorted to actions at law with de­
creasing frequency until finally the jurisdiction of equity over infringement suits 
became for all practical purposes exclusive.”); Lemley, supra note 46, at 1704 
(noting that even after merger of legal and equitable pleading, juries rarely de­
cided more than damages in patent cases for several decades).
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B. The Codification vs. Flexibility of Patent Law and Equity
1.	  IS PATENT LAW DECISIONAL LAW, STATUTORY LAW, OR 
BOTH? 
Although patent law in the United States federal system began 
with the Constitution,69 it continued both through statutory and de­
cisional law, in courts of both law and equity, that changed over its 
hundreds of years of history.70 The Constitution provides that “Con­
gress shall have power . . . [t]o promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discover­
ies . . . .”71 The First Congress acted quickly on this power by pass­
ing the Patent Act of 1790, which contained some of the basic con­
tours of patent law including, inter alia, the requirement to clearly 
describe the patented invention in exchange for a right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the invention and the require­
ment that the invention be “useful” and “not before known or
used.”72 In the Patent Act of 1793, Congress added, among other 
changes, a provision that “simply changing the form or the propor­
tions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall 
not be deemed a discovery,”73 which historical scholarship traces as
the origin of the obviousness doctrine in United States patent law.74 
These statutory origins formed the basis for later decisional law de­
velopments of the precise contours of these doctrines.75 
69 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
70 See Nard, supra note 8, at 61. Before the formation of federal patent law,
several states began to issue patents, which often resulted in conflicting rights 
between different inventors from state to state. Id. (discussing key historical
events in development of United States patent law). 
71 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
72 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790). 
73 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793).
74 See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (2007). Some others view obviousness as arising entirely 
from decisional law, but although decisional law played an important role in the 
development of obviousness, decisional law was not its sole source. See Patent 
Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793). 
75 See Duffy, supra note 74, at 38 (discussing the role of decisional law in
obviousness); Nard, supra note 8, at 53 (noting the large role of decisional law in
development of the patent law).
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
    
  
  
 
 
    
  
   
     
      
   
 
     
      
  
 
    
   
    
     
  
 
 
 17 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
In many areas of law outside of patent law, the contours of the 
law are set out more specifically in the statutory text than they are
in patent law.76 For example, in copyright law, which has a signifi­
cant body of decisional law around the defense of fair use, the stat­
utory text sets out the specific factors to be considered by courts in 
this analysis.77 In contrast, the current statutory provision for obvi­
ousness in patent law lists no factors for consideration and instead 
relies on broad references to what “would have been obvious.”78 
This provision is not unbounded, however, merely because the stat­
utory text does not set forth verbatim the factors to be considered— 
it was framed by a body of decisional law (originally deriving from 
statute) that was later codified and modified by Congress in amend­
ments to the Patent Act.79 
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
77 Id. 
78 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be ob­
tained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as 
set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the
prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordi­
nary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not
be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.”); see also Nard, 
supra note 8, at 72 (citing Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 
U.S. 84, 91 (1941)) (noting that Supreme Court, during a particularly anti-patent
period in 1930s and 1940s, enhanced requirement of invention).
79 The 1793 Act’s obviousness provision stating what “shall not be deemed a 
discovery” was eliminated in 1836, Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 120 
(1836), after which decisional law that had formed based on that provision never­
theless continued to be cited and developed in decisional law. Duffy, supra note
74, at 36, 38–41 (discussing historical development of obviousness through com­
mon law, including after elimination of the 1793 standard, such as in Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850), and in time leading up to 1952 Patent Act).
In the Patent Act of 1952, Congress codified the obviousness doctrine as it had 
developed in the decisional law in some respects, such as the requirement that a
patent must not be “obvious at the time the invention as made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art.” Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103). However, the statutory provision also 
clamped down on the heightened standards for inventive genius that developed in
the early twentieth century decisional law by stating that “[p]atentability shall not 
be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.” Id.; see Nard, supra
note 8, at 72 (discussing intent to eliminate enhanced invention requirement of 
Cuno Eng’g Corp., 314 U.S. at 91).
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Scholars have urged that, because of the patent code’s broad lan­
guage and lack of specified rules or factors, in addition to analogiz­
ing the patent code to the broad language of the antitrust statutes, the 
patent code “is a common law enabling statute.”80 These scholars
argue that the patent statutes leave room for the development of pat­
ent law doctrines “emanating solely from Article III’s province,”
outside the statutory text.81 However, even if this was once true early 
in patent law’s development, in 1952, Congress amended the Patent 
Act in part in an attempt to stabilize the decisional law of patents 
such that, under a traditional approach to statutory interpretation, 
much of what seems from a surface reading of the text to be a com­
mon law enabling statute would actually codify and set boundaries 
upon doctrines based on prior imputed law.82 
The incorporation and stabilization of decisional law through 
codification is possible under the statutory interpretative canon of
imputed common law meaning.83 The terms of a statute are often
understood according to the plain meaning of those statutory terms 
at the time of enactment.84 When a term in a statute has an
80 See Nard, supra note 8, at 53, 59 (“United States patent law is designed to
invite, indeed require, a strong judicial voice.”); see Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at
801 (stating by analogy to Sherman Act that patent law “has always depended on
common law elaboration . . . .”).
81 See Nard, supra note 8, at 53.
82 See Federico, supra note 27, at 166 (“The [P]atent [A]ct of 1952 . . . stems 
from two movements, one to amend the patent laws, and the other to revise and
codify the laws of the United States.”); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980) (“[I]n its 1952 codification of the patent laws Congress 
endeavored, at least in part, to substitute statutory precepts for the general judicial 
rules that had governed prior to that time.”). 
83 See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 554-557 (1994); Sekhar 
v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732 (2013).
84 See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Under­
writers Ins. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (“[W]hen the 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it ac­
cording to its terms.”); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)
(“That which it meant when adopted it means now.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012)
(“In their full context, words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at
the time they were written—with the understanding that general terms may em­
brace later technological innovations.”). Although courts have not always fol­
lowed a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, over the last several
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
      
 
    
  
  
     
  
 
 
  
   
 
   
    
 
  
   
  
  
      
  
 
  
 
   
  
 19 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
established meaning in decisional law at the time of enactment,
however, under the canon of imputed common law meaning, the 
term takes the meaning that it had in decisional law, along with the 
contours and exceptions that are applied in decisional law.85 In other 
words, there are two ways for Congress to place limits upon a 
decades modern Supreme Court cases have increasingly used textualism as the
primarily lens of statutory interpretation. See John F. Manning, Second-Genera­
tion Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1291–93, 1304 (2010); James J. Brudney 
& Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Su­
preme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220,
222 (2006); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1971, 1981 (2005); see also Christa J. Laser, The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Stat­
utory, Historical, and Normative Analysis, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1127, 1136–37 (2018)
[hereinafter Laser, The Scope of IPR Estoppel] (discussing Supreme Court’s shift
to a textualist approach and normative justifications for the same). 
85 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016)
(“[I]t is a settled principle of interpretation that, absent other indication, Congress 
intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it 
uses.”) (quoting Sekhar, 570 U.S. at 732); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23
(1999); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1992) (quoting Morissette 
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms
of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of 
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached 
to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the 
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In 
such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely 
accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)) (“[W]here Congress uses terms that have accu­
mulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the 
statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established 
meaning of these terms.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 320–21 (“A stat­
ute that uses a common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law 
meaning”); Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962) (“For in the ab­
sence of anything to the contrary it is fair to assume that Congress used that word 
in the statute in its common-law sense.”); McCool v. Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 
459, 469 (1861) (quoting Hillhouse v. Chester, 3 Day 166, 211–12 (Conn. 1808)) 
(“[W]henever our Legislature use a term without defining it . . . they must be sup­
posed to use it in the sense in which it is understood in the English law.”); see also
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) (“Under the general
rule that a common-law term comes with its common-law meaning, we cannot
conclude that Congress intended to ‘drop’ the heightened standard of proof from
the presumption simply because § 282 fails to reiterate it expressly.”). This canon
is distinct from the canon against interpretation in derogation of the common law. 
See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). 
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statutory doctrine: to spell out those limits in the text or to incorpo­
rate those limits as they are applied in decisional law.86 
Under the traditional approach to statutory interpretation that of­
ten predominates in the modern Supreme Court, the analysis of im­
puted decisional law must “begin with the state of the common 
law . . . when [the statute] was enacted.”87 For example, in Consoli­
dated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, the Supreme Court determined that,
although the common law of negligence had developed in the eight 
decades since enactment of the statute at issue, the Federal Employ­
ers’ Liability Act of 1908, the standard for negligence incorporated
into the statute was limited to negligence as it was established in the
common law at the time of enactment.88 In Sekhar v. United States, 
the Supreme Court considered, when trying to determine the type of 
conduct that qualified as “extortion” under the Hobbs Act, inter alia, 
that, “[a]s far as is known, no case predating the Hobbs Act—Eng­
lish, federal, or state—ever identified conduct such as that charged 
here as extortionate.”89 This does not preclude the application of
steady law to new facts, but it means that courts examining the reach
of a doctrine under the traditional approach would consider the im­
puted precedent as a potential limitation on the scope of those doc­
trines.90 Patent law is one area of law where a significant debate 
86 See Evans, 504 U.S. at 259–60 (1992) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms
of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of 
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached 
to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the 
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In 
such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely
accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.”(emphasis added)). 
87 See Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 554. But see Peter L. Strauss, On Re-
segregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429,
436 (1994) (quoting Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (1936)) (“A su[b]stantial number of statutory cases decided
during October Term 1993 offered the Court a choice between treating statutes as 
static, isolated instructions from higher authority, and regarding them as part of a 
‘unified system of judge-made and statute law.’ It tended to make the former
choice, one that segregates statutes from the common law. [I]n the process, it di­
minishes both statute and common law, both legislature and court.”). 
88 Consolidated Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 554–57. 
89 Sekhar, 570 U.S. at 733.
90 See Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 339 (1941) (“Old crimes, 
however, may be committed under new conditions. Old laws apply to changed
situations.”); see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 80. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
  
  
  
 
 
       
   
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
    
 
 21 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
exists as to the impact of codification on the law and the weight to
be given to pre-codification decisional law because, as explored be­
low, a body of decisional law existed prior to the Patent Act of 1952. 
2. THE SURPRISING CONFORMITY OF EQUITY
One might assume, based on the origins of equity in pleas toward 
conscience and relief from law,91 that reference to equitable doc­
trines in a statute is also a reference to principles that are entirely
flexible, changeable, able to adapt to any scenario, and able to pre­
vent any injustice committed under the law.92 However, modern eq­
uity is more constrained than its origins suggest.93 Under modern 
approaches, “courts of equity must be governed by rules and prece­
dents no less than the courts of law.”94 Even those cases that espouse 
flexibility in equity nevertheless apply standards and tests for defin­
ing the scope of an established set of equitable doctrines and attempt 
to follow precedent.95 
91 See Subrin, supra note 19, at 918 (noting the origins of equity in requests 
for relief from the tyranny of law); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61 (Sweet 1836) (quoting seven­
teenth century jurist Hugo Grotius as saying that equity is “the correction of that, 
wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient.”). 
92 See Bray, supra note 22, at 1011, 1016, 1018 (asserting that, historically, 
“equity had decisions, principles, even rules” but “no text that had been made
supreme law through ratification,” making determining any consistent precedent
of courts of equity “a fool’s errand” that can at best generate “an artificial history
of equity.”).
93 See DAVIES & VIRGO, supra note 40, at 4 (“But, over the years, Equity 
became more rule-based and principled, with identifiable doctrines being recog­
nized. This was largely because the Equity jurisdiction was transferred from the
Chancellor to judges, whose decisions had precedent for future decisions, so that
like cases could be treated alike.”); Main, supra note 43, at 448 (“The administra­
tion of equity, much like the administration of law became bound and confined 
by the channels of its own precedents and the technicalities of its own proce­
dures.”).
94 Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 127 (1995)). “[T]he fact that the writ 
has been called an ‘equitable’ remedy . . . does not authorize a court to ignore this 
body of statutes, rules, and precedents.” Id.
95 See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244–47 
(1933) (applying equitable principle of unclean hands, setting forth standards un­
der which it applies, and determining whether facts fit within the scope of doctrine
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Indeed, precedent and standards in the application of equitable
principles are paramount to the rule of law.96 Although equity some­
times has characteristics of discretion, “[d]iscretion is not whim, and
limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the 
basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.”97 
As the Supreme Court has stated,“[T]he alternative is to use each
equity chancellor’s conscience as a measure of equity, which alter­
native would be as arbitrary and uncertain as measuring distance by 
the length of each chancellor’s foot.”98 
as applied in prior precedent); Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 658 (1912) (be­
ginning a statement of standards applicable to equitable relief from judgment with 
following preface: “Without attempting to draw any precise line to which courts
of equity will advance, and which they cannot pass . . . .”); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gor­
mully, 144 U.S. 224, 237 (1892) (stating that judicial discretion to determine 
reach of equity is “exercised, it is true, according to the settled principles of equity, 
and not arbitrarily or capriciously, and always with reference to the facts of the
particular case”); see also Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 127 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stat­
ing that, as early as the founding, “equity had developed into a precise legal sys­
tem encompassing certain recognized categories of cases . . . .”). But see Bray, 
supra note 22, at 1011, 1016, 1018 (asserting that, historically “equity had deci­
sions, principles, even rules,” but “no text that had been made supreme law
through ratification,” making determining any consistent precedent of courts of
equity “a fool’s errand” that can at best generate “an artificial history of eq­
uity . . . .”); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (stating
that “[f]lexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished” equitable jurisdiction). 
96 See Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 323. 
97 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 
(2005)). 
98 Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 323. The often-repeated caution not to measure equity
by the “chancellor’s foot” is a reference to the following commentary reflecting 
the flexible equity of seventeenth century England:
1. Equity in law is the same that the spirit is in religion, what
everyone pleases to make it. Sometimes they go according to 
conscience, sometimes according to law, sometimes according 
to the rule of court. 
2. Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure, know 
what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him 
that is chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity.
‘Tis all one, as if they should make the standard for the measure 
we call a foot, a chancellor’s foot. What an uncertain measure
would this be. One chancellor has a long foot, another a short
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Moreover, some argue that constraints upon courts of equity 
were a consideration as early as the formation of the federal judici­
ary.99 At the founding, after facing criticism by Anti-Federalists that 
the proposed equity jurisdiction of federal courts would grant too 
much power unconstrained by law, Alexander Hamilton stated, “To 
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that 
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which 
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that 
comes before them . . . .”100 English commentators likewise noted
that if courts of equity were not constrained by precedent, their 
“powers would have become too arbitrary to have been endured in 
a country like this, which boasts of being governed in all respects by 
law and not by will.”101 
Equitable doctrines have been subject to limits and standards for 
at least one hundred years.102 A traditional statutory analysis of pro­
visions that incorporate equitable doctrines will, therefore, need to 
consider what limits and standards were applicable to these 
foot, a third an indifferent foot; ‘tis the same thing in the chan­
cellor’s conscience. 
THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDON 60–61 (Samuel Harvey Reynolds ed., Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1892). 
99 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 126 (Thomas, J., concurring).
100 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing federal
courts generally). Hamilton gave this reassurance in response to disputes between
Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the scope of equity jurisdiction in Article III 
of the constitution, when Anti-Federalists expressed concern that federal equity 
courts would have too much power if they were not constrained by precedent. See
id.; Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 126 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining history of dis­
pute between Federalists and Anti-Federalists regarding Article III of the Consti­
tution); Morley, supra note 45, at 231 (quoting LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER III (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 244
(Herbert J. Storing ed. 1981)) (noting that Anti-Federalists warned that equitable
powers would enable federal judges to simply “step into his shoes of equity, and 
give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate . . . .”); see also U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity . . . .”).
101  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 440
(Portland, Thomas B. Wait, & Co. 1807).
102 See DAVIES & VIRGO, supra note 40, at 4.
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doctrines in prior decisional law.103 Although the substantive law, at 
the time of enactment, might have incorporated a degree of discre­
tion that could perhaps be imputed and carried over into modern in­
terpretations, the broad contours of the doctrine may be limited by 
prior cases under traditional interpretive methods.104 
C. Statutory Interpretive Regimes: Dynamic Versus 

Traditional 

1.  DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Professor William Eskridge urged courts to engage in “dynamic 
statutory interpretation” this is an approach under which courts con­
sider changes in societal and legal norms in determining the inter­
pretation of legal texts.105 Under the dynamic statutory interpreta­
tion approach, courts would follow the text of a statute when it is
unambiguous; however, what a statute “ought to mean in terms of 
the needs and goals of our present day society” can outweigh other 
interpretive perspectives that are traditionally used to resolve ambi­
guity or fill gaps, such as perspectives that look to the intent of the 
legislature or textualist canons.106 Indeed, Professor Eskridge urges 
“original legislative expectations” should not control meaning 
“when the statute is old and generally phrased and the societal or 
legal context of the statute has changed in material ways.”107 Pro­
fessor Eskridge’s dynamic approach is a milder variation of that of 
then-professor, now judge, Guido Calabresi, who proposed that in 
103 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416–17 (1975) (quoting 
Eldon, L.C., in Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (1818) (stating that “when
Congress invokes the Chancellor’s conscience to further transcendent legislative 
purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent 
with those purposes and not ‘equity [which] varies like the Chancellor’s foot’”
and concluding that reference in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to court’s dis­
cretion to award back pay or other equitable relief did not mean that court’s dis­
cretion was unfettered by standards or shielded from review).
104 See DAVIES & VIRGO, supra note 40, at 4; see also Main, supra note 43, at 
448; Nard, supra note 8, at 53. 
105 Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1479; see also Sunstein, supra note 7, at 412
(arguing for a moderate dynamic approach that looks first to textual and interpre­
tive canons).
106 Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1480–81 (quoting Arthur W. Phelps, Factors
Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 456, 469 (1950)). 
107 Id. at 1481. 
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an “age of statutes” courts should nevertheless retain powers to de­
velop law as though statutes were no more than prior common law
precedent, including in narrow cases, by engaging in “conscious[] 
review[]” of statutory text to ensure it meets present-day goals.108 
These flexible approaches evoke English law’s “equity of the stat­
ute,” which was used in England prior to the eighteenth century to 
justify exceptions or extensions of statutes based on the fairness of 
a case.109 
2. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES: THE FAITHFUL AGENT
In contrast with the dynamic approach, one traditional interpre­
tive approach in American law urges that courts interpreting statutes
are presumed to be Congress’s “faithful agents,” discerning and ap­
plying statutory texts in service of Congress’s directive.110 The 
choice of a theory of interpretation incorporates a choice of the ap­
propriate, respective authority of Congress and the courts under our 
Constitution.111 Critics of a dynamic approach urge that the U.S.
Constitution broke from English practice in part because of a view 
that limiting judicial power and allocating lawmaking authority into 
the hands of a legislative branch would promote rule of law.112 Un­
der the traditional view, the formalization of bicameralism and pre­
sentment in the Constitution also militates against judicial lawmak­
ing outside this process.113 Proponents of purposivism, intentional-
ism, and textualism all seek to discern Congress’s directive under a 
faithful agent approach to interpretation; however, each uses differ­
ent tools to attempt to do so.114 
108  CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 2. 

109 See Manning, supra note 7, at 30. 

110 See id. at 5; see Sunstein, supra note 7, at 415; see Zeppos, supra note 12,
 
at 1313. 
111 See Schacter, supra note 13, at 593; Manning, Constitutional Structure and 
Judicial Deference, supra note 13, at 636–37. 
112 See Manning, supra note 7, at 57. 
113 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be pre­
sented to the President of the United States . . . .”); see Manning, supra note 7, at 
57–58. 
114 See Manning, supra note 7, at 6–7; see also Sunstein, supra note 7, at 415– 
34.
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II. APPLICATIONS OF EQUITY IN PATENT LAW
Most of equity in patent law today is governed by equitable doc­
trines that were broadly incorporated into statutory text by reference 
to prior decisional law, where they originated. For example, the Pat­
ent Act of 1836 provided that the availability of equitable relief in 
patent law would be determined “according to the course and prin­
ciples of courts of equity.”115 As discussed below, in the late nine­
teenth and early twentieth centuries, decisional law developed that 
set forth the standards and structural contours of several particular 
equitable defenses.116 Defenses such as laches, estoppel, unclean 
hands, and misuse were then imputed into the 1952 Patent Act’s ref­
erence to the defense of unenforceability (and in some cases also
modified by the statute, such as in the statutory exceptions to patent 
misuse). The determination of whether and how equitable doctrines 
were incorporated into the statutory text, and whether the doctrines 
can extend past their historical roots after incorporation, has im­
mense impact: If the reach of an equitable defense is determined to
extend into actions at law, the defense can render the entirety of an 
infringement verdict—including years of proven past violations of 
the patentee’s rights—uncollectable.117 In contrast, an equitable de­
fense that does not reach into law would, in the modern era, only 
115 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 120 (1836). The portion of the 
current patent code setting forth the scope of the injunction remedy for patent
infringement, provides that “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under
this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to pre­
vent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems 
reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. § 283; see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006) (interpreting this provision as requiring that courts grant­
ing an injunction apply a “traditional four-factor test” where “[a] plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies avail­
able at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would 
not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). There is no similar reference to
equity in the portion of the Patent Act that provides the damages remedy for in­
fringement. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award 
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement . . . .”).
116 See infra Part II.B.–F.; Nard, supra note 8, at 53–54. 

117 See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684 (2014).
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extend to equitable or prospective relief such as the right to injunc­
tion.118 
As of this writing, the Supreme Court has yet to define the im­
pact of codification of many of these equitable defenses. The Su­
preme Court recently determined that the equitable defense of laches 
is not available to bar damages in actions at law within the applica­
ble statute of limitations; however, it left open whether laches might 
result in unenforceability under different circumstances.119 The Su­
preme Court has also noted that equitable estoppel, which barred 
actions at law before the merger of law and equity, remains available 
to bar actions at law.120 However, the Supreme Court has not de­
cided to what extent substantive equitable defenses such as unclean 
hands, inequitable conduct, or misuse are applicable in actions at 
law and to what extent any of these defenses can expand to new 
scenarios unlike those applicable in the decisional law at the time of
enactment. Most recently, in 2019, the Court denied certiorari in 
Merck & Co. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., which had posed the question 
of whether and under what circumstances unclean hands could bar 
damages at law.121 
As litigants begin to press courts to apply equitable defenses to 
bar entire actions for patent litigation or extend these doctrines in 
other ways, courts will need to decide how to apply these de­
fenses.122 However, to apply these nuanced doctrines accurately,
118 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 966–67 (2017). 
119 See id. at 967. 
120 See Petrella, 572 U.S. at 684 (“The gravamen of estoppel, a defense long 
recognized as available in actions at law, is misleading and consequent loss.”)
(internal citations omitted); Hinton, supra note 51, at 721 (“Formerly, a defend­
ant, when sued at law, had no defense on the ground of equitable estoppel, but
was forced into equity for an injunction to restrain the prosecution of the action.
In the course of time, however, in spite of theoretical objections and practical dif­
ficulties, equitable estoppels became generally recognized as defenses at 
law . . . .”); see also Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 78 (1880) (discussing appli­
cation of equitable estoppel in an action at law). 
121 Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231, 1233, 1247 (Fed. Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019). 
122 See SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 967–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1479; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 412. For example, liti­
gants might attempt to extend equitable defenses to bar remedies based on the 
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courts must engage not only with the equities of a particular case but 
also with statutory history, doctrinal history, and the appropriateness 
of given interpretive lenses. This Part seeks to set out the statutory 
history and historical decisional law around each of these defenses 
to ease that burden. 
A. Section 282: Statutory Basis for Unenforceability Defenses
The Patent Act provides a statutory right to a civil action to re­
cover for patent infringement: “A patentee shall have remedy by 
civil action for infringement of his patent.”123 However, this right is
not inviolable because section 282 of the Patent Act makes available 
certain “defenses in any action involving the validity or infringe­
ment of a patent.”124 Among other defenses, such as noninfringe­
ment and invalidity for failure to comply with the preconditions for
patentability listed in the patent statute, section 282 provides that 
“unenforceability” of a patent shall be a defense: 
(b) Defenses.—The following shall be defenses in 
any action involving the validity or infringement of
a patent and shall be pleaded: 
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for in­
fringement or unenforceability. 
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on
any ground specified in part II as a condition for 
patentability. 
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for
failure to comply with—
(A) any requirement of section 112, except 
that the failure to disclose the best mode shall 
not be a basis on which any claim of a patent 
may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise 
unenforceable; or 
assertion of large numbers of patents, high pricing of patented goods, or the send­
ing of numerous cease and desist letters. 
123 35 U.S.C. § 281. 
124 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 
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(B) any requirement of section 251. 
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this 
title.125 
The text of the patent statute provides no definition of what consti­
tutes a defense of “unenforceability” and what the legal effect of an
unenforceability defense would be.126 In this circumstance, the stat­
utory interpretive canons, as currently applied by the Supreme 
Court, would direct the analysis both to a review of statutory history 
and considerations of the standards and limitations of the referenced
doctrine under established decisional law at the time of enact­
ment.127 
125 Id.
 
126 See id.
 
127 Supra Part I.B.; see also Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579
 
U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732 (2013)) (“[I]t
is a settled principle of interpretation that, absent other indication, Congress in­
tends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.”);
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999) (imputing a requirement of materi­
ality from common law test for fraud to a statute using an undefined term “de­
fraud”); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1992) (quoting Morissette, 
342 U.S. at 263 (1952)) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are 
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presuma­
bly knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of 
contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, 
not as a departure from them.”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 
322 (1992) (“[W]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning 
under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dic­
tates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these 
terms . . . .”) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
739 (1989)); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 320–22 (“A statute that uses a
common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning” alt­
hough the common law that will be imputed is that from either the Supreme Court
or from a “uniform interpretation” by other courts); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) (“Under the general rule that a common-law term 
comes with its common-law meaning, we cannot conclude that Congress intended 
to ‘drop’ the heightened standard of proof from the presumption simply because 
§ 282 fails to reiterate it expressly.”); Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 
(1962) (“For in the absence of anything to the contrary it is fair to assume that
Congress used that word in the statute in its common-law sense.”); McCool v. 
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Although legislative history is not a primary source of statutory 
meaning under current Supreme Court approaches,128 the legislative 
history, if used here, would reinforce approaches that look to or in­
corporate decisional law. Specifically, in congressional statements,
legislators noted that the addition of unenforceability was meant to
codify the decisional law of unenforceability that existed at the time 
of enactment: 
The Senate amendments are primarily technical. The 
addition of the words “or unenforceability”—this is 
the subject matter of the committee amendment No. 
3—will place in the code this word which has been 
used in numerous court decisions under the section 
in question.129 
When asked whether “the bill change[s] the law in any way or only
codif[ies] the present patent laws,” the senator that entered the
above-quoted statement responded, “It codifies the present patent 
laws.”130 
Looking closer at statutory history,131 defenses to patent in­
fringement were previously set out by statute in the Patent Act of 
1870: 
Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 459, 469 (1861) (quoting Chester, 3 Day at 211–12) 
(“[W]henever our Legislature use a term without defining it . . . they must be sup­
posed to use it in the sense in which it is understood in the English law.”). 
128 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. at 568 (stating
that, under Supreme Court’s current approach to statutory interpretation, “the au­
thoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other 
extrinsic material.”). 
129 98 CONG. REC. 9249, 9323 (July 4, 1952) (statements of Sen. McCarran).
130 Id.; see Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980) 
(“[I]n its 1952 codification of the patent laws Congress endeavored, at least in 
part, to substitute statutory precepts for the general judicial rules that had gov­
erned prior to that time.”); see also Federico, supra note 84, at 166 (“The patent
act of 1952 [this title] stems from two movements, one to amend the patent laws, 
and the other to revise and codify the laws of the United States.”).
131 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 256 (stating that statutory history,
i.e., amendments or repeal of provisions over time, may be considered when in­
terpreting a statute and history of a statute is presumed to be known by Congress 
when amending a statute). 
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And be it further enacted, That in any action for in­
fringement the defendant may plead the general is­
sue, and having given notice in writing to the plain­
tiff or his attorney, thirty days before, may prove on 
trial any one or more of the following special mat­
ters:—
First. That for the purpose of deceiving the public the 
description and specification filed by the patentee in
the patent office was made to contain less than the
whole truth relative to his invention or discovery, or 
more than is necessary to produce the desired effect; 
or, 
Second. That he had surreptitiously or unjustly ob­
tained the patent for that which was in fact invented 
by another, who was using reasonable diligence in 
adapting and perfecting the same; or, 
Third. That it had been patented or described in some 
printed publication prior to his supposed invention or 
discovery thereof; or, 
Fourth. That he was not the original and first inventor 
or discoverer of any material and substantial part of 
the thing patented; or, 
Fifth. That it had been in public use or on sale in this
country, for more than two years before his applica­
tion for a patent, or had been abandoned to the pub­
lic. . . . 
And the like defenses may be pleaded in any suit in 
equity for relief against an alleged infringement; and 
proofs of the same may be given upon like notice in 
the answer of the defendant, and with the like ef­
fect.132 
132 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208 (codified as amended
at 60 Rev. Stat. § 4920 (1874)). 
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The 1870 statute includes no mention of unenforceability, although
it included several defenses based on deception in obtaining a pat­
ent.133 This provision was not further amended until the Patent Act 
of 1952, which inter alia, added the concept of unenforceability, 
amending section 282 to its current form.134 There are two ways in
which the modifications made in 1952 were potentially significant
as to the reach of equitable defenses.135 
First, the addition of unenforceability invokes more and differ­
ent defenses than the previous defenses of deception in obtaining a 
patent. Specifically, a limited defense was previously available un­
der the 1870 statute136 for deceptively obtaining a patent invented
by another person or deceptively claiming something different than 
one invented (and deception in obtaining a patent was mentioned in 
the statutes, although did not serve as a full defense, between 1790 
and 1870, as discussed further in the inequitable conduct section).137 
Under the statute as written in 1870, this deception functioned not 
only to bar equitable claims but also claims at law.138 Given this 
outcome, deception in obtaining a patent beyond the scope of one’s 
invention might more accurately be described as a species of inva­
lidity than an equitable defense.139 
133 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206.
134 See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codified as
amended in 35 U.S.C. § 282); see also S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 9 (1952), reprinted
in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402–03. The legislative committee reports urge that 
at a high level the change did not materially alter the statute. See S. REP. NO. 82­
1979 at 9 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2403 (stating that “[t]he
defenses to a suit for infringement are stated in general terms, changing the lan­
guage in the present statute, but not materially changing the substance”); H.R.
REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10 (1952) (explaining that five defenses named in R.S. 4920 
the Patent Act of 1870 are omitted and replaced by a broader paragraph specifying
defenses in general terms).
135 See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codified as
amended in 35 U.S.C. § 282); infra Part II.C.
136 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 54, 16 Stat. 198, 206.
137 Infra Part II.C.
138 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208. (“[T]he like de­
fenses may be pleaded in any suit in equity for relief against an alleged infringe­
ment [or] in the answer of the defendant . . . .”).
139 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food & Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172, 175–76 (1965) (“[A] person sued for infringement may challenge the validity
of the patent on various grounds, including fraudulent procurement.”).
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The 1952 Patent Act added something more: As noted in the
congressional floor statements, the defense of unenforceability in­
voked the word as it “ha[d] been used in numerous court deci­
sions.”140 At the time of the Patent Act’s enactment, unenforceabil­
ity encompassed unclean hands (such as severe litigation miscon­
duct, bribery, or manufacture or suppression of evidence that related 
to the request for relief sought),141 a derivative of unclean hands 
termed “patent misuse” (anticompetitive conduct in excess of the 
patent scope),142 and procedural fairness doctrines (such as laches 
and estoppel).143 Providing reassurance that these are the defenses 
referred to by the term “unenforceability,” two years after the 1952 
Patent Act’s enactment, one of its drafters stated that section 282 
“would include . . . equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and
unclean hands”: 
The defenses which may be raised in an action in­
volving the validity or infringement of a patent are 
specified in general terms, by the second paragraph 
of section 282, in five numbered items. Item 1 spec­
ifies “Noninfringement, absence of liability for in­
fringement, or unenforceability” (the last word was 
added by amendment in the Senate for greater clar­
ity); this would include the defenses such as that the 
patented invention has not been made, used or sold 
by the defendant; license; and equitable defenses 
such as laches, estoppel and unclean hands . . . .All 
the defenses usually listed in textbooks on patent law 
may be placed in one or another of the enumerated 
categories, except a few which are no longer applica­
ble in view of changes in the new statute.144 
The Supreme Court’s current approach to statutory interpretation
would dictate looking to these doctrines as they existed at the time 
of enactment, as is examined in detail in the sections below.145 
140 98 CONG. REC. 9249, 9323 (1952) (statements of Sen. McCarran). 

141 Infra Part II.D. 

142 Infra Part II.F. 

143 Infra Part II.B.–C.
 
144 Federico, supra note 27, at 215–16. 

145 Supra Part I.B.
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Second, when replacing the 1870 Patent Act with the 1952 Pat­
ent Act, Congress eliminated its statement that the listed “defenses 
may be pleaded in any suit in equity for relief against an alleged 
infringement” or “in the answer of the defendant, and with the like 
effect,” i.e., as a defense in an action at law, and left in its place only 
that “the following shall be defenses in any action.”146 Both the text
and legislative history are silent on whether, as a result of this 
change, what was referred to as unenforceability at the time would 
now act to bar all legal claims.147 There are three possible ways to 
interpret this change. First, the phrase “defenses in any action” could 
mean that these defenses would apply equally and substantively to 
law or equity, but this would be contrary to the interpretation of sim­
ilar language used in the first steps toward the merger of law and 
equity, whereby the mere procedural availability of a defense in any 
action did not necessarily make that defense sufficient to bar all le­
gal claims.148 As a second alternative, the removal of this statement 
could mean that the listed matters would no longer constitute a de­
fense to both law and equity—only those described as invalidity 
would apply to both, whereas unenforceability would only refer to
equitable relief149. However, the differences between the 1870 and 
1952 language are not sufficiently clear to presume such a stark 
change in meaning. As a third alternative, courts could read the stat­
utory lack of clarity as requiring either, under a dynamic approach, 
courts to determine the boundaries or, under a faithful agent ap­
proach, courts to examine the decisional law available at the time to
determine the reach of defenses with previously established mean­
ings in common law. Under the third approach, courts would not 
assume that facts sufficient to support restriction of equitable relief 
146 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) with Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 
Stat. 198, 208.
147 See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 8–9 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2402–03; see H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 10 (1952); see Federico, supra note 
27, at 215.
148 35 U.S.C. § 282(b); see Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat’l. Bank, 260 U.S.
235, 242 (1922) (stating that 1915 Law and Equity Act, which made equitable 
defenses available in actions at law, did not effect a substantive change).
149 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 256 (noting that when an amend­
ment of a statute makes a substantive change to language of statutory provision, 
amendment is presumed to result in a change in meaning, as long as that reading 
would not conflict with text).
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are sufficient to bar legal relief but would instead adopt a case-by­
case approach that draws guidance from prior decisional law. 
B. Equitable Estoppel 
Equitable estoppel is one of the few equitable defenses that was 
completely assimilated into actions at law.150 The doctrine of equi­
table estoppel first developed in courts of equity.151 Equitable estop­
pel bars recovery when a party seeking relief engages in misleading 
conduct on which another relies to their detriment.152 This defense 
is not unique to patent cases153 but can arise in patent cases when 
the patentee communicates that it will not press an infringement 
claim against the alleged infringer for specific activities.154 Previ­
ously, a party raising equitable estoppel against an action at law had 
to seek the aid of a court of equity to restrain the action at law; long
before the merger of law and equity, equitable estoppel was directly
available in courts of law to bar legal relief.155 Indeed, as early as 
1880, the Supreme Court stated that equitable estoppel “has been 
applied in cases arising in courts of law.”156 Because equitable es­
toppel was available in actions at law prior to codification of unen­
forceability defenses in the 1952 Patent Act,157 equitable estoppel 
150 See Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 77–78 (1880) (explaining that the ap­
plication of equitable estoppel should not be “restricted in courts of law”).
151 See id. at 78 (discussing origins of doctrine in equity); see Hinton, supra 
note 51, at 721.
152 See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 
59 (1984); Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684 (2014). 
(“The gravamen of estoppel, a defense long recognized as available in actions at
law, . . . is misleading and consequent loss.”). 
153 See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001). 
154 See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1042 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The patentee’s conduct must have supported an inference that
the patentee did not intend to press an infringement claim against the alleged in­
fringer . . . .In the most common situation, the patentee specifically objects to the 
activities currently asserted as infringement in the suit and then does not follow 
up for years.”). 
155 Hinton, supra note 51, at 721 (“Formerly, a defendant, when sued at law,
had no defense on the ground of equitable estoppel, but was forced into equity for 
an injunction to restrain the prosecution of the action. In the course of time, how­
ever, in spite of theoretical objections and practical difficulties, equitable estop­
pels became generally recognized as defenses at law . . . .”).
156 Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 77 (1880). 
157 See Petrella, 572 U.S. at 684. 
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would be available to bar actions at law in cases decided under that 
statute, regardless of the interpretive lens through which one viewed 
equitable defenses. 
C. Laches 
Laches, on the other hand, is a procedural equitable doctrine that 
the Supreme Court has determined is limited in actions at law.158 
Specifically, the Supreme Court held in SCA Hygiene Products Ak­
tiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC that the equitable de­
fense of laches is not available to bar damages in actions at law
within the applicable statute of limitations.159 Laches is a defense 
developed in courts of equity that applies when a plaintiff acts with
“unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing suit.”160 In briefs
submitted to the SCA Hygiene Court, scholars and stakeholders de­
bated alternate histories of laches and interpretations of the “unen­
forceability” defenses in section 282.161 Some cited cases where 
courts had extended laches to bar actions at law, and yet, others 
noted that there was no uniform consensus of lower courts nor a Su­
preme Court decision holding that laches could be extended to bar 
remedies at law prior to the Patent Act.162 Ultimately, however, the
Supreme Court sidestepped the question of history and determined 
that the patent statute’s six-year statute of limitations, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 286, precluded any equitable defense of laches that might other­
wise apply to claims for damages brought within that time period.163 
The Court held that “[w]hen Congress enacts a statute of limitations, 
it speaks directly to the issue of timeliness . . . .”164 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court’s decision in SCA Hygiene left open the questions of
whether laches might result in unenforceability in other ways, such
158 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 966–67 (2017). 
159 Id.
 
160 Id. at 960.
 
161 See id. at 963 (discussing arguments regarding statutory interpretation of
 
the Patent Act’s reference to unenforceability); Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Pro­
fessors in Support of Petitioners at 6–7, SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S.
Ct. 954 (No. 15-927).
162 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 963; see Brief of Ami­
cus Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 161. 
163 See SCA Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 967.
164 Id. at 960.
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
     
   
   
   
 37 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
as barring only equitable remedies, what impact pre-codification 
history has on the reach of equitable defenses, or whether, and in 
what ways, equitable defenses can develop after codification.165 
These two procedural equitable defenses, equitable estoppel and 
laches, reflect two different ends of the spectrum with respect to in­
corporating equity into actions at law, with equitable estoppel bar­
ring all remedies at law and laches barring none under the Supreme 
Court’s current approach.166 For the remaining defenses discussed
herein, the substantive defenses of unclean hands, inequitable con­
duct, and misuse, the Supreme Court has not fully elucidated their 
reach. The history of these defenses, as discussed in the pages that 
follow, is also widely misunderstood. 
D. Unclean Hands 
1. LAW AS OF ENACTMENT
As of the 1952 Patent Act, unclean hands is another doctrine that 
provided a remedy of patent unenforceability.167 Under the doctrine 
of unclean hands, one who seeks relief from a court of equity must 
come to court with “clean hands.”168 Specifically, a court of equity 
may dismiss the claim for equitable relief where the party seeking 
relief has committed an “unconscionable act . . . [that] has immedi­
ate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of
the matter in litigation.”169 
In a series of cases decided before the 1952 Patent Act’s enact­
ment, the Supreme Court examined the contours of the unclean 
hands doctrine in patent law, holding that the doctrine can bar asser­
tion of a patent for unconscionable conduct, including fraud, brib­
ery, perjury, and suppression of evidence, where the conduct is 
165 See id. at 959. 
166 See Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 77–78 (1880) (explaining that applica­
tion of equitable estoppel should not be “restricted in courts of law”); see SCA 
Hygiene, 137 S. Ct. at 964–67. 
167 See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 241–47 
(1933). 
168 Id. at 241.
169 Id. at 245.
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related to the request for relief.170 Under this line of cases, a finding 
of unclean hands could result in unenforceability, in whole or in part, 
barring equitable claims where a party committed an unconsciona­
ble act related to the equitable relief sought171 and barring legal 
claims, or providing relief from judgment at law, where a party com­
mitted fraud in obtaining the patent or the judgment, among other 
narrow circumstances.172 In essence, as will be explained below, this
line of cases establishes two distinct subspecies of unclean hands: 
(1) unconscionable conduct sufficient to bar equitable relief, in
which the court has some discretion, albeit constrained by the prec­
edents of equity in light of codification in the Patent Act; and (2)
unconscionable conduct sufficient to bar legal relief, which is lim­
ited to the narrow circumstances in which a party historically could 
have interposed equity against a case at law, including fraud.173 
First, in 1933, the Supreme Court in Keystone held that a pat­
entee’s manufacture and suppression of evidence in a lawsuit justi­
fied dismissal of a patent infringement suit brought in equity under 
the doctrine of unclean hands.174 Although the suit at issue was 
brought in a court of equity, it included requests for both an injunc­
tion and damages, as permitted in courts of equity by the Patent Act 
of 1870.175 The basis for unclean hands was that, before bringing a 
170 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 816 (1945) (blackmail and suppression of evidence); see Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240, 245 (1944) (manufacture and 
suppression of evidence and bribery); see Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 243– 
44 (bribery and suppression of evidence).
171 See Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 247 (dismissing suit for patent in­
fringement that was brought in a court of equity).
172 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 240, 245.
173 See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 236 (1892) (declining to
grant equitable relief but not holding written instrument invalid, noting that
“whether this contract be absolutely void, as contravening public policy, or not, 
we are clearly of the opinion that it does not belong to that class of contracts, the
specific performance of which a court of equity can be called upon to enforce.”);
Ames, supra note 60, at 51 (discussing limited circumstances under which equity
could be interposed to bar a contract claim at law, including fraud in the formation 
of the contract). 
174 Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 245–47.
175 See Gen. Excavator Co. v. Keystone Driller Co., 62 F.2d 48, 48–51 (6th 
Cir. 1932), aff’d, 290 U.S. 240 (1933). Courts of equity were able to provide 
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prior lawsuit against another party, the patentee, suspecting that
prior use by Bernard Clutter could invalidate the patent that the pat­
enter sought to assert, paid Mr. Clutter to suppress evidence of his 
prior use and sign an affidavit declaring that such use was experi­
mental.176 The court in the prior case did not discover the evidence 
of prior public use and found the patent valid and infringed.177 The 
patentee then brought a second suit against General Excavator, and 
relied upon its success in the prior suit as a basis for a request for 
temporary relief, which the district court granted in part.178 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined 
that the patentee’s unclean hands barred equitable relief, but not nec­
essarily legal relief, and instructed dismissal of the suit at equity
without prejudice to filing a new suit for damages at law:179 
Under the above-stated principles we are of the opin­
ion that the plaintiff should have been denied relief 
in a court of equity. The decrees of the District Court 
are reversed, and the causes are remanded, with in­
structions to dismiss the bills of complaint without 
prejudice to the prosecution of suits at law, or, 
damages remedies in patent infringement cases pursuant to the Patent Act of 1870,
in addition to injunction and restitutionary remedies, whereas courts of law were 
only permitted to grant legal remedies. See supra § I.B.
176 Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 243. The payment for the affidavit in­
cluded an additional contingent payment in the event the patent was found valid
by the court. See Gen. Excavator Co., 62 F.2d at 49. Although the patentee was 
aware of the prior use before issuance of the patent, patentee’s counsel advised
him that it could be an experimental use, so patentee proceeded with patenting 
without disclosing the use and only approached Mr. Clutter shortly prior to filing
the first suit. Id. at 50–51. Therefore, there was no manufacture of evidence as
part of obtaining the patent from the Patent Office. Id. at 50–51. 
177 Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 242.
178 Id. (noting that district court denied temporary injunctive relief but ordered 
payment of a bond to cover future restitutionary or damages awards). 
179 See Gen. Excavator Co., 62 F.2d at 50–51. Prior to the creation of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, which has exclu­
sive jurisdiction over patent appeals, patent cases were appealed to regional circuit 
courts of appeal. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (“The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction—(1) of an ap­
peal . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party 
has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relat­
ing to patents . . . .”).
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indeed, to subsequent actions in equity upon the 
other patents in suit.180 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision also left open the possibility that a suit 
not tainted by such misconduct could proceed, such as a new suit 
(even perhaps one at equity) that lacks the request for temporary re­
lief that was tainted by suppressed evidence.181 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision, in­
cluding the determination that the dismissal was without prejudice 
to suits at law, although the Court’s opinion did not address the dis­
tinction that the Sixth Circuit drew between application of unclean
hands in law versus in equity.182 Instead, the Supreme Court’s anal­
ysis in Keystone focused primarily on whether the unclean hands in 
the prior action was sufficiently related to the second suit to justify 
application of the doctrine of unclean hands to bar the second suit, 
highlighting the need for a nexus between the complained-of con­
duct and the suit at issue.183 The Court found that it was sufficiently 
related, primarily because the temporary relief in the second suit,
180 Gen. Excavator Co., 62 F.2d at 50–51 (emphases added). 
181 See id. at 51 (“Possibly the plaintiff may now have the right to commence 
anew an action in equity upon all the patents, including patent No. 1,511,114.
Upon this we express no opinion.”). In an opinion denying the request for rehear­
ing, the appellate court further emphasized the equitable nature of the defense. 
See Gen. Excavator Co., 64 F.2d at 39–40 (“Prior to the adopted of the New Eq­
uity Rules (28 USCA § 723), the question could never have arisen for a bill cov­
ering multiple causes of action would have been bad for duplicity. Such new Eq­
uity Rules are not intended to change the general nature and characteristics of a
court of equity as a court of conscience in which the granting of relief is largely 
discretionary and the court is not bound by hard and fast rules. It is true that a 
system of equity practice has grown up and that present-day courts are inclined to
follow precedents rather strictly. On the other hand, we have not held any of the
patents in suit invalid for adjudicated any of the rights of the parties inter sese. 
The doctrine which we have applied is simply that if one, as actor, seeks to set the 
judicial machinery in a court of equity in motion upon grounds in respect to which
his conduct is sullied, he will find the doors of the court closed against him.” 
(citations omitted)). 
182 Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 244, 247.
183 See id. at 245–47 (“But courts of equity do not make the quality of suitors 
the test . . . . They do not close their doors because of plaintiff’s misconduct, 
whatever its character, that has no relation to anything involved in the suit, but
only for such violations of conscience as in some measure affect the equitable
relations between the parties in respect of something brought before the court for 
adjudication.”). 
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which would be burdensome to defendants during the progress of 
suit, depended on the fact that the patent was found valid and in­
fringed in the prior suit.184 
Keystone highlights that a court may bar equitable relief where 
the party seeking relief commits an unconscionable act, including 
bribery and suppression of evidence, that forms the basis for the re­
quest for relief.185 Keystone also provides a glimpse into the tension
that existed at the time between flexibility and conformity in equity,
holding that courts determining the appropriateness of equitable re­
lief had discretion within limits.186 Specifically, although the Court 
in Keystone stated that “[courts of equity] are not bound by formula 
or restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel the free and just 
exercise of discretion,” the Court also set forth conditions on that 
discretion: “[C]ourts of equity do not make the quality of suitors the 
test”, but rather, the act must be “unconscionable” and have an “im­
mediate and necessary” nexus to the relief sought.187 
Second, in 1944, in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire 
Co., the Supreme Court held that when the patentee used bribery and
manufactured evidence with the intent to defraud both the Patent 
Office in issuing the patent and the courts during litigation, the doc­
trine of unclean hands could be used to overturn a previous judgment 
of validity and infringement arising from a court of equity (where
the patentee sought both equitable relief and damages).188 The patent 
applicant in Hazel-Atlas, in response to “insurmountable Patent Of­
fice opposition” to its patent application, paid a prominent trade pro­
fessional to publish what he made appear to be an unbiased article 
declaring the invention groundbreaking.189 Then, the Patent Office 
granted the patent.190 The patentee brought suit for infringement and 
184 Id. at 246–47.
 
185 See id. at 245–47. 

186 Id. at 245–46. 

187 Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245–46 (1933). 

188 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240, 

249–51 (1944). Because the original suit was filed in 1928 and sought both in­
junction and damages, it could only have been brought in the court of equity, the 
only court at the time that could grant both equitable and legal remedies. See id. 
at 241 (noting that complaint “pray[ed] for an injunction against further infringe­
ment and for an accounting for profits and damages.”).
189 Id. at 240.
 
190 Id. at 241.
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lost at the district court, but on appeal relied heavily on the article to 
obtain a decision from the appeals court that the patent was valid
and infringed.191 Thereafter, the parties settled, so the court did not 
rule on damages.192 When the fraud was uncovered years later, the 
Supreme Court reversed the prior judgment and directed judgment
to be entered against the patentee, noting, “[t]he total effect of all 
this fraud, practiced both on the Patent Office and the courts, calls 
for nothing less than a complete denial of relief to Hartford for the
claimed infringement of the patent thereby procured and en­
forced.”193 
The Court in Hazel-Atlas cited a long-standing rule in equity 
whereby an injunction could be entered to stop enforcement of a 
judgment from any court in the event of fraud that formed the basis 
of the entry of judgment.194 The Court cited cases decided outside 
of patent law and well before the merger of law and equity that held 
that a court in equity could enjoin a party from collecting damages
on a judgment that was based on fraud.195 For example, in one of the 
cases cited in Hazel-Atlas, Marshall v. Holmes, the Court held that 
where a prior judgment for damages at law was based upon “false 
testimony and forged documents,” “established principles of equity” 
justified “protection against the judgments alleged to have been 
fraudulently obtained.”196 
Another pre-merger case on which the Court in Hazel-Atlas re­
lied held that relief from a judgment at law was available in a court 
of equity where there was “something to render it manifestly uncon­
scionable for his successful adversary to enforce the judgment,”
such as fraud in obtaining the judgment.197 The Court noted that 
191 Id.
 
192 Id. at 243–244. 

193 Id. at 250.
 
194 Id. at 244 (“From the beginning there has existed alongside the term rule a 

rule of equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-
discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term 
of their entry.”). 
195 Id. (citing Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 601 (1891)). 

196 Marshall, 141 U.S. at 590, 601. 

197 Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 657 (1912) (“In order to warrant the 

interposition of a court of equity to restrain the enforcement of a judgment at law, 
it is, of course, not sufficient for the defeated party to show that because of some 
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such an interposition of equity could also be based on newly discov­
ered evidence that could not have been previously discovered and 
that makes maintaining the judgment unconscionable198—what to­
day would form the basis for a retrial.199 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has noted that courts in equity in England had powers to render pa­
tents unenforceable if they were obtained by fraud.200 Contracts and 
land patents that were procured by fraud could also historically be 
modified or rendered invalid by a court of equity such that they
could no longer support a suit at law.201 This line of cases provides
historical support for an equitable defense of unclean hands that pro­
vides relief from judgment at law in narrow circumstances, such as 
fraud in obtaining a prior court judgment or fraud in obtaining a 
written instrument, such as a patent.202 
In a third Supreme Court patent case on unclean hands, Preci­
sion Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Ma­
chinery Co., a party obtained via blackmail the rights to another’s
newly discovered evidence pertaining to an issue in the case, or because of some
newly discovered fact that might have been put in issue, he would probably have
a better prospect of success on a retrial of the action. He must show something to
render it manifestly unconscionable for his successful adversary to enforce the 
judgment.”). 
198 Id. at 658 (“Without attempting to draw any precise line to which courts of
equity will advance, and which they cannot pass, in restraining parties from avail­
ing themselves of judgments obtained at law, it may safely be said that any fact
which clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of 
which the injured party could not have availed himself in a court of law; or of 
which he might have availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or acci­
dent unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will justify an
application to a court of chancery.”). 
199  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2).
200 See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 361 (1888) (discuss­
ing English cases and noting that “in a case of fraud in the obtaining of a patent, 
a Court of Chancery, by virtue of that fact, has jurisdiction to repeal or revoke 
it”).
201 Mfrs.’ Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 449, 451 (1935) (noting that eq­
uitable defense of unclean hands was “inapplicable” on those facts to a contract 
case brought at law, yet noting that contract was valid and no fraud was alleged
and citing cases indicating that a contract procured by fraud could justify the in­
terposition of equity); see Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533, 535 (1877) (noting
that a court of equity could invalidate a land patent, stating that “in this class of
cases, as in all others, there exists in the courts of equity the jurisdiction to . . . re­
lieve against frauds”).
202 See Mfrs.’ Fin. Co., 294 U.S. at 449.
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patent that it knew was obtained by false declarations of dates of 
conception and reduction to practice.203 The party suppressed the 
evidence of that falsity and then sought to enforce the patents in a 
court of equity against the original patent owner.204 The Court held 
that the “facts all add up to the inescapable conclusion that [the party 
asserting the patent] has not displayed that standard of conduct req­
uisite to the maintenance of this suit in equity” and dismissed the
suit.205 The Court noted that when unclean hands is invoked against 
a litigant seeking equitable relief, the “maxim necessarily gives wide 
range to the equity court’s use of discretion in refusing to aid the 
unclean litigant” and “[a]ny willful act concerning the cause of ac­
tion which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of 
conduct is sufficient . . . .”206 
The line of cases discussed above stand for the principles that 
equitable relief, such as a request for injunction, can be barred where 
a party committed an unconscionable act immediately related to the 
equity sought207 and legal relief can be barred if fraud formed the
basis of a legal judgment.208 If one were to apply a faithful agent 
interpretive method, then these cases—particularly the cases shortly 
prior to the 1952 Patent Act that resulted in unenforceability of a 
patent209—would help define the unenforceability defense to patent
infringement under the 1952 Patent Act. Specifically, under this ap­
proach, the 1952 Patent Act’s reference to unenforceability would 
incorporate unenforceability doctrines from the time of enactment, 
along with the boundaries of these doctrines at the time. 
2. LAW SINCE ENACTMENT
The Federal Circuit has further delineated the contours of the 
doctrine of unclean hands since the passage of the 1952 Patent Act, 
often in ways that are consistent with the reach of the doctrine under 
203 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 808–16 (1945). 
204 See id. 

205 Id. at 819.
 
206 Id. at 815.
 
207 See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 246–47 

(1933). 
208 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 
(1944).
209 See id. at 251. 
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the Supreme Court’s pre-1952 caselaw.210 For example, the Federal 
Circuit has stated that a successful unclean hands defense bars only 
the present suit and does not result in invalidity or unenforceability 
of the patent as to other parties (except, as in the inequitable conduct 
doctrine discussed below, where the conduct involves fraud in ob­
taining the patent).211 This is consistent with the history of the de­
fense, which merely operated to turn a plaintiff seeking equity out 
of the court of equity except in the narrow circumstances where it 
could apply to bar a judgment entered at law.212 The Federal Circuit 
has also determined that when the conduct at issue relates only to a 
single patent in a multi-patent suit, only that patent is rendered un­
enforceable rather than all the patents in suit unless the misconduct
is immediately related to each other patent.213 This is consistent with
the principle stated under Keystone that unclean hands only applies 
where the unconscionable act has “immediate and necessary relation 
to the equity that [the plaintiff] seeks . . . .”214 
Some litigants have urged courts to find unclean hands for con­
duct such as sending vexatious and unfounded patent infringement 
210 See Therasense Inc. v. Becton, Dickson, & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285–86
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
211 Id. at 1287 (distinguishing inequitable conduct from unclean hands and 
collecting cases where remedy for unclean hands was limited to dismissal); see 
Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“While inequitable conduct before the PTO renders the patent unenforceable by
any party, the unclean hands doctrine bars only the offending party” and “only
provides a bar to relief in the case at hand.”). 
212 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292. 
213 See SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 378 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (“SSIH relies solely on the supposition that all of the patents are so 
interrelated that [patentee’s] ‘unclean hands’ with respect to the later patents ren­
ders the [asserted] patent unenforceable. We reject this contention as a matter of 
law.”); FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 524 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
v. (“[FMC] can not use Foster to invoke an unclean hands defense to the entire
judicial proceeding.”); see also Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231, 
1248 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019) (dismissing a second
patent in suit based on the facts at issue, but agreeing that misconduct relating to
one patent “does not defeat claims under another patent simply because they were
‘brought . . . in the same lawsuit’”). 
214 Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933). 
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demand letters215 or filing excessive numbers of patents “intended 
to create a ‘legal thicket.’”216 The doctrine of unclean hands as ap­
plied by the Supreme Court prior to codification extended only to
conduct that was “unconscionable,” such as fraud, bribery, black­
mail, manufacture of evidence, and suppression of evidence.217 
Whether this conduct would fall within those bounds is ultimately a 
question for the court, which must consider not only which interpre­
tive method is appropriate but also whether the facts fit within the 
boundaries of the law under that method.218 
The Federal Circuit has extended the doctrine of unclean hands 
to bar legal relief in more than the narrow cases where this occurred
pre-1952 (fraud in obtaining the judgment of relief or fraud in ob­
taining the patent).219 In Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co., the 
Federal Circuit found that unclean hands justified summary judg­
ment barring legal and equitable relief where, prior to suit, an attor­
ney breached an ethical firewall to obtain information useful to pat­
ent strategy (but not material to patentability) and during suit gave
false testimony in support of validity.220 Although the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari on this petition,221 this result raises the ques­
tion of whether it is appropriate use the equitable defense of unclean 
hands to bar legal relief based on conduct that is sufficiently egre­
gious even when the conduct might fall short of fraud in obtaining 
215 See Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs. Corp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1073,
1078 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding unclean hands barred all relief where patentee was 
“threatening its competitors with the intellectual property rights it did not own,” 
but also forged assignment documents and failed to disclose the forgery in dis­
covery).
216 Cf. Nomadix, Inc. v. Hosp. Core Servs., LLC, No. CV 14–08256 (VBKx), 
2015 WL 3948804, at *11 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (finding unclean hands not
available based on allegations of a patent “‘thicket’”). 
217 Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 243 (bribery and suppression of evi­
dence); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944) 
(manufacture and suppression of evidence and bribery); Precision Instrument
Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (blackmail and 
suppression of evidence). 
218 See Keystone Driller Co., 290 at U.S. at 245–46.
219 See Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 888 F.3d 1231, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019). 
220 Id. at 1233, 1240, 1248. 
221 Merck & Co. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     
 
  
   
   
 
  
  
   
   
 
  
  
   
 47 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
the judgment, i.e., if the conduct was not a but-for cause of the find­
ing or judgment in the patentee’s favor.222 
The Federal Circuit in Gilead also found that conduct before the
Patent Office could support a finding of unclean hands that bars le­
gal relief based only on the fact that the conduct “enhanced the 
claimant’s legal position as to . . . the creation . . . of the legal rights 
at issue.”223 This is despite the fact that the court acknowledged the 
conduct before the PTO did not amount to inequitable conduct.224 
Although severe prosecution misconduct might be sufficient under 
pre-1952 caselaw to bar equitable relief, nothing in the pre-1952 
caselaw would have barred legal relief based on prosecution mis­
conduct that does not rise to the level of inequitable conduct or fraud 
in obtaining the patent.225 In these ways, the Federal Circuit has
adopted an approach to unclean hands that expands the doctrine be­
yond its pre-codification roots.226 
As explored further below, two related doctrines are often said
to have developed from unclean hands: inequitable conduct and pat­
ent misuse.227 The history of unclean hands provides a critical
framework for the analysis of the proper scope of these doctrines. 
E. Inequitable Conduct 
The inequitable conduct doctrine renders a patent unenforceable 
and invalid if the asserted patent was obtained by materially de­
frauding the patent office.228 Specifically, under the Federal 
222 See Gilead Scis., 888 F.3d. at 1239, 1247 (discussing balancing of equities, 
relying on wrongful conduct to apply unclean hands defense).
223 Id. at 1240. 
224 Id.
225 Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) 
(“But courts of equity do not make the quality of suitors the test . . . . They do not
close their doors because of plaintiff’s misconduct, whatever its character, that
has no relation to anything involved in the suit, but only for such violations of 
conscience as in some measure affect the equitable relations between the parties 
in respect of something brought before the court for adjudication.”).
226 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (“As the inequitable conduct doctrine evolved from unclean hands 
cases, it came to embrace a broader scope of misconduct.”). 
227 Id. (“Inequitable conduct also diverged from the doctrine of unclean 
hands.”); see Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-493 (1942)
(noting the relationship between patent misuse to unclean hands).
228 Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287.
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
   
  
  
   
    
      
   
 
48 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1
Circuit’s current articulation of the standard for inequitable conduct, 
a patent is unenforceable and invalid for inequitable conduct if, in 
obtaining a patent, “the applicant [or patentee] misrepresented or 
omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the
[Patent and Trademark Office (‘PTO’)]” and if the court determines 
that a finding of inequitable conduct is justified after “weigh[ing] 
the equities.”229 Information is material to patentability if “the PTO 
would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed 
[prior act].”230 In other words, for information to be material, it must
be capable of rendering the patent invalid.231 
The Federal Circuit has said that inequitable conduct arose as a 
species of the unclean hands defense in patent law.232 However, as 
will be explored in more detail below, the true history of the doctrine 
is more complex and has a number of independent statutory origins 
from the doctrine of unclean hands. This Part will also explore a
change made by the America Invents Act to the statutory provision 
governing the validity of patent claims if other claims of the patent 
are found invalid. 
1. STATUTORY HISTORY OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
A right to revocation of a patent for inequitable conduct-like be­
havior was originally codified in 1790: This patent statute, the first 
in the United States, created a right for defendants to file a motion
in the district court for repeal of a patent within one year of issuance 
on the ground that the patent “was obtained surreptitiously by, or 
upon false suggestion.”233 Only legal remedies were available for
229 Id.
 
230 Id. at 1291. 

231 See id. 

232 Id. at 1287 (asserting that origins of inequitable conduct defense to patent
 
infringement is in unclean hands, including Keystone Driller Co., Precision In­
strument, and Hazel-Atlas that are discussed above); see Gen. Electro Musical 
Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting
Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1394 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)) (“The concept of inequitable conduct in patent procurement derives
from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands: that a person who obtains a patent
by intentionally misleading the PTO can not enforce the patent.”). 
233 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111; see Robert J. Goldman, 
Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L.
 
 
 
 
 
   
    
    
 
  
     
    
     
     
 
  
 
 
  
   
     
  
  
  
 
    
   
 
 49 2020] EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN PATENT LAW
patent infringement at that time (the remedies were expanded in the
early nineteenth century to include equitable remedies), and any 
such motion would have been filed in a court of law.234 Additionally,
the 1790 statute provided that judgment should be entered for de­
fendant, i.e., that there would be a defense to patent infringement “if 
the concealment of part, or the addition of more than is necessary” 
to what was claimed as the invention “shall appear to have been in­
tended to mislead, or shall actually mislead the public, so as the ef­
fect described cannot be produced by the means specified . . . .”235 
In 1836, amendments to the Patent Act narrowed the previously 
available private right of action to revoke patents for inequitable 
conduct-like behavior to what we would today call an interference 
proceeding, i.e., where a party challenges whether that party or the 
patentee was the first inventor.236 For most of the 1800s, however, 
an action in a court sitting in equity was available to the government 
to revoke a patent for fraud on the patent office.237 However, other 
than as interference, no action or defense was available to 
& TECH. 37, 40 (1993); Lemley, supra note 46, at 1696; David McGowan, Ineq­
uitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 948 (2010). The period to file this 
motion was later increased to three years. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 
318, 323.
234 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423–24
(1908) (“[T]hough at first only a remedy at law was given for a violation of the
right, a remedy in equity was given as early as 1819.”). 
235 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 6, 1 Stat. 109, 111–112. 
236 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 16, 5 Stat. 117, 123–24; see Lemley, supra
note 46, at 1699. 
237 See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1333 n.9 
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Prior to 1836, Congress had authorized suit for scire facias to 
invalidate a patent where the suit, though brought by a private party, was under
the control of the United States. In the Patent Act of 1836, Congress re-pealed that 
provision, but the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory change did not re­
move the United States’ ability to sue in equity to invalidate a patent, at least
where there had been fraud on the patent office.”); United States v. Am. Bell Tel.
Co., 128 U.S. 315, 372 (1888) (“[Such a suit by the United States] is so widely
different, so much more beneficial, and is pursued under circumstances so much
more likely to secure complete justice, than any defense which can be made by an
individual infringer, that it is impossible to suppose that Congress, in granting this
right to the individual, intended to supersede or take away the more enlarged rem­
edy of the government.”); John F. Duffy, The Inequities of Inequitable Conduct: 
A Case Study of Judicial Control of Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 
417, 418 (2013) (discussing the history of inequitable conduct). 
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individuals under the statute to use inequitable conduct to defend 
against pat-ent infringement from 1836 to 1870.238 
In an amendment to the patent statutes in 1870, Congress pro­
vided that certain deceitful behaviors would constitute a defense to 
patent infringement: 
And be it further enacted, That in any action for in­
fringement the defendant may plead the general is­
sue, and having given notice in writing to the plain­
tiff or his attorney, thirty days before, may prove on 
trial any one or more of the following special mat­
ters:—
First. That for the purpose of deceiving the public the
description and specification filed by the patentee in
the patent office was made to contain less than the
whole truth relative to his invention or discovery, or 
more than is necessary to produce the desired effect; 
or, 
Second. That he had surreptitiously or unjustly ob­
tained the patent for that which was in fact invented 
by another, who was using reasonable diligence in 
adapting and perfecting the same; . . . 
And the like defenses may be pleaded in any suit in 
equity for relief against an alleged infringement; and 
proofs of the same may be given upon like notice in 
the answer of the defendant, and with the like ef­
fect.239 
As noted above, the 1952 Act then removed the specific enu­
merations of defenses for deceitful conduct in obtaining a patent.240 
The first defense from the 1870 statute was removed in favor of the 
more general defense of invalidity in the 1952 statute.241 Drafter 
238 Duffy, supra note 137, at 426–427. 
239 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208 (codified as amended 
at 60 Rev. Stat. § 4920 (1874)) (emphasis added). 
240 See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codified as
amended in 35 U.S.C. § 282). 
241 Federico, supra note 27, at 162–63, 216.
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Federico noted shortly after enactment that inadequate description
with deceitful intent became superfluous because inadequate de­
scription already resulted in invalidity; “failure to give a description
of the invention as required by section 112 is a defense without re­
gard to intention.”242 The intent element of the second defense was 
removed and the considerations of whether a patentee was the first 
to invent was incorporated into the 1952 Act’s section 102(g).243 
One way to interpret these changes is to conclude that inequitable
conduct, to the extent it remained available to bar legal claims, was 
merged into the defense of “invalidity” in section 282.244 
2. THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF SECTION 288’S DECEPTIVE 
INTENT EXCEPTION ON INFECTIOUS INVALIDITY FOR 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
One might wonder why an accused infringer would still raise 
inequitable conduct, which depends upon information being suffi­
ciently material to render a patent invalid, instead of only asserting 
invalidity in light of these statutory changes to the availability of 
defenses regardless of deceptive intent. One reason is that, although 
invalid patent claims generally do not render the other claims in a 
patent infectiously invalid, some modern courts have read inequita­
ble conduct as barring the patentee from asserting any claim in that 
patent, i.e., as having infectious invalidity.245 Specifically, in
caselaw prior to the passage of the America Invents Act, the Federal 
Circuit held that when one claim in a patent is tainted with inequita­
ble conduct, the remaining claims of the patent are not enforcea­
ble.246 
242 Id.
243 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 102(g), 66 Stat. 792, 797; Federico, supra 
note 27, at 216. 
244 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codified as amended 
in 35 U.S.C. § 282). 
245 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
246 See id. When the conduct at issue relates only to a single patent in a multi-
patent suit, in contrast, only that patent is rendered invalid or unenforceable due
to inequitable conduct unless the misconduct was material to the validity of re­
lated applications. See id.; Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1332 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The ‘554 patent is not unenforceable due to inequitable conduct 
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Section 288 of the 1952 Patent Act provided that if one patent 
claim was found invalid, the remaining claims of the patent would 
not be invalid, except those invalid with “deceptive intention”: 
“Whenever, without deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is inva­
lid, an action may be maintained for the infringement of a claim of 
the patent which may be valid.”247 Similarly, section 253 provided
that “[w]henever, without any deceptive intention, a claim of a pa­
tent is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered 
invalid.”248 Under the statutory interpretation canon of expressio
unius the negative implication of these provisions would be that an 
action may not be maintained on a patent where any claim of the 
patent was found invalid with deceptive intention.249 Federico stated 
that these provisions were enacted to counter a rule previously ap­
plicable under common law where “if a patent was invalid in part it 
was invalid in whole, that is, if any one claim of a patent was invalid 
the entire patent fell.”250 
merely because its claims were improperly included in an application with other 
patentable inventions that were ultimately held unenforceable for inequitable con­
duct.”).
247 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 288, 66 Stat. 792, 813 (1952) (current ver­
sion is at 35 U.S.C. § 288 (2018)). 
248 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 253, 66 Stat. 792, 809 (1952) (current ver­
sion is at 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2018)). 
249 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 107. Under the Negative-Impli­
cation Canon, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the specification of one is the 
exclusion of another. Id.; see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters
Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (finding that a statute specifying that trustees 
could obtain certain relief under a provision of a statute precluded others from
obtaining relief under that provision); see also United States v. Giordano, 416 
U.S. 505, 514 (1974) (finding that a statute establishing that certain procedures 
could be authorized by Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General excluded
others from authorizing those procedures, by negative implication).
250 Federico, supra note 27, at 208. Under the prior rule, before a patentee 
could bring another suit, a patentee with an invalid claim would be required to file
a disclaimer with the Patent Office such that the patent would claim only material 
that was not previously found invalid. See id. The 1952 Patent Act also provided
procedures for disclaimer of the portions of the patent that were invalid, which 
likewise were not available if claims were found invalid with deceptive intent. 
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 253, 66 Stat. 792, 809 (1952) (current version is at 
35 U.S.C. § 253) (“Whenever, without any deceptive intention, a claim of a patent 
is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered invalid. A patentee, 
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Today, however, sections 288 and 253 of the Patent Act omit 
any mention of deceptive intent: “[w]henever a claim of a patent is
invalid, an action may be maintained for the infringement of a claim 
of the patent which may be valid”251 and “[w]henever a claim of a 
patent is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered 
invalid.”252 The exception for deceptive intent was stricken from 
both of these provisions by the 2011 America Invents Act.253 The 
removal of the deceptive intent exception originated in the first bill 
of what later became the America Invents Act, the proposed Patent 
Reform Act of 2005.254 This change was later reintroduced as a
“technical amendment” in the bill offered in January 2011, which 
became part of the America Invents Act.255 In floor debates, legisla­
tors noted that the elimination of the “deceptive intention” exception
related to, inter alia, “enforcing remaining valid claims if a claim is 
invalidated”: 
At subsections (a) through (h), section 16 of the 
bill has been modified by reinserting language that 
eliminates various deceptive-intent requirements that 
relate to correcting the naming of the inventor or a 
joint inventor, obtaining a retroactive foreign filing
license, seeking section 251 reissue, or enforcing re­
maining valid claims if a claim is invalidated. See 
generally Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & 
Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 596, 7th Cir. 1971. These 
changes were first proposed in section 5 of the origi­
nal Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th 
Congress, and have been advocated by universities 
and their technology-transfer offices. For reasons
whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein, may, on payment of the fee
required by law, make disclaimer of any complete claim, stating therein the extent 
of his interest in such patent.”).
251 35 U.S.C. § 288 (2018). 
252 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2018). 
253 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 20(e), (h), 125 
Stat. 284, 334 (2011). 
254 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong., § 5(c) (2005).
255 Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. § 16 (2011); see also Joe
Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 447 (2011). 
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that are not entirely clear, subsequent bills main­
tained this section and its addition of substructure 
and titles to the affected code sections, but struck the 
substantive part of the section—i.e., its elimination 
of the deceptive-intent requirements. 
Eliminating the various deceptive-intent require­
ments moves the U.S. patent system away from the 
19th century model that focused on the patent 
owner’s subjective intent, and towards a more objec­
tive-evidence-based system that will be much 
cheaper to litigate and more efficient to adminis­
ter.256 
The appellate court decision, Kearney, referenced in this com­
mentary also provides some evidence that the meaning of the term 
“invalid” in section 288 includes circumstances where no patent suit 
at law could be maintained because of fraud in obtaining the patent,
i.e., inequitable conduct.257 Applying the 1952 version of section 
288, the court in Kearney held that “actual fraud or other inequitable 
conduct” falls within the deceptive intent exception of former sec­
tion 288, rendering all the claims of the patent invalid.258 The court 
in Kearney reasoned, “a patent procured by fraud [is] not merely 
unenforceable but invalid,” citing to a Supreme Court patent-anti­
trust case, Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and 
Chemical Corp.259 Indeed, in Walker Process, the Supreme Court 
rejected the holding of the lower courts that “proof of fraudulent 
procurement may be used to bar recovery for infringement . . . but 
not to establish invalidity.”260 The Court held that “a person sued for 
infringement may challenge the validity of the patent on various 
grounds, including fraudulent procurement.”261 
256 157 CONG. REC. S1378 (daily ed. March 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
257 Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 596 
(7th Cir. 1971). 
258 Id. (“Fairly read, § 288 prohibits the maintenance of any action on a patent
which includes claims which are invalid by reason of deceptive intention.”). 
259 Id. at 594 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. 
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175–76 (1965)). 
260 Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 175. 
261 Id. at 176 (emphasis added) (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Em­
pire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250 (1944)). 
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Joe Matal, a senior legislative staffer involved in drafting the 
America Invents Act, stated in an article written shortly after enact­
ment that “the repeal of the deceptive-intent bar in § 288, which al­
lows enforcement of other claims if one is found to be invalid, 
should limit the infectious invalidity that otherwise results from a 
finding of inequitable conduct.”262 During the legislative process
leading up to the America Invents Act, Senator Orrin Hatch stated 
that inequitable conduct “has been overpleaded and has become a 
drag on the litigation process.”263 Moreover, as to other portions of 
the America Invents Act, legislators stated that “[t]he term [unen­
forceability] should be considered to be used interchangeably with 
‘invalidity’ . . . .”264 This history, including the statutory history of 
changes made to section 288 and case law including Kearney265 and
Walker Process,266 could suggest that the term “invalid” in section 
288 includes determinations of inequitable conduct such that, after 
the America Invents Act, inequitable conduct might no longer result 
in invalidity of other patent claims beyond the claims that were 
fraudulently procured. 
Nevertheless, even if infectious invalidity is no longer available, 
accused infringers will likely continue to assert inequitable conduct 
for several reasons: A finding of inequitable conduct might support 
a determination that the case is sufficiently “exceptional” to justify
an award of attorney’s fees to the defendant under section 285.267 A 
262 Matal, supra note 255, at 643. 
263 153 CONG. REC. S4691 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
Matal, supra note 255, at 546. 
264 157 CONG. REC. S1378 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(quoting J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1984)) (“Whether the holding should be one of invalidity or unenforceability has 
had no practical significance in cases thus far presented to this court . . . .”); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 50 (2011) (“Patents are unenforceable and invalid
if they are obtained through fraud.”). 
265 Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 596 
(7th Cir. 1971). 
266 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
175–76 (1965). 
267 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2018) (“The court in exceptional cases may award rea­
sonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”); see Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON 
Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 555 (2014) (holding that conduct need not 
be “independently sanctionable” such as “inequitable conduct in procuring the
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finding of inequitable conduct might also form the basis of antitrust 
allegations, which come with potential for treble damages.268 Dis­
covery into inequitable conduct can also serve strategic purposes for 
accused infringers by adding to the patentee’s discovery burdens, 
provided that there is a legitimate basis for the accusation.269 
In light of the statutory history of inequitable conduct, particu­
larly the current version of the patent statute’s lack of any incorpo­
ration of the doctrine beyond the general requirements for validity, 
inequitable conduct cannot be said to be an independent defense as 
opposed to a type of invalidity. Its contours might be relevant, as 
noted, to determine whether attorney’s fees270 are warranted or an­
titrust liability applies.271 However, these are beyond the scope of 
equitable defenses or the availability of equitable relief in patent 
cases. In this sense, inequitable conduct is merely “invalidity plus.” 
Nevertheless, the primary contours of the doctrine as it stands in
the Federal Circuit—with a requirement that the conduct be in­
tended to deceive the Patent Office and, if it were discovered during 
prosecution, sufficient to render the patent invalid before both legal 
and equitable claims are barred272—fits well within the second cat­
egory of unclean hands for fraud in obtaining the instrument that 
forms the basis of suit. Therefore, inequitable conduct that would 
render a patent invalid would justify a bar of both legal and equitable 
forms of relief under either interpretive approach. 
patent” to justify a fee award, which suggests that inequitable conduct might sup­
port such an award). 
268 See Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 174; see Duffy, supra note 
237, at 440 (noting that inequitable conduct was not widely asserted in patent
cases until after Walker Process signaled that it could support antitrust liability). 
269 See. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (providing sanctions for allegations made “for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly in­
crease the cost of litigation”). Note that a patentee’s conduct might be sanctiona­
ble, even if it does not support an equitable defense. 
270 Octane Fitness, LLC, 572 U.S. at 555. 
271 Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174. 
272 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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F. Patent Misuse 
Patent misuse is an unenforceability defense that is related to the 
doctrine of unclean hands.273 A variety of conduct has been found 
to be misuse of a patent if the court determines that the patentee has
improperly exploited the patent right beyond the scope of the pat­
ented invention or beyond the duration of the patent.274 Although 
anticompetitive conduct may constitute patent misuse, the current 
reach of the misuse doctrine is not coextensive with antitrust laws.275 
Misuse focuses on the impact on the public interest of the patentee’s 
actions to exceed the patent scope: “It . . . forbids the use of the pa­
tent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by 
the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to
grant.”276 Once the misuse has been “‘purged,’” or the conduct of 
the patentee no longer impermissibly exceeds the scope of the patent 
right in a way that violates public policy, the patentee may again 
273 C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“The defense of patent misuse arises from the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands . . . . Patent misuse arises in equity, and a holding of misuse renders the 
patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged; it does not, of itself, invalidate 
the patent.”). 
274 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
A patentee’s right to exclude includes the right to exclude others from “mak[ing], 
us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented invention, within the United 
States or import[ing] into the United States any patented invention during the term 
of the patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A patentee’s conduct might be found to
exceed the scope of the patent right either by going beyond the disclosed invention 
(such as by tying) or beyond the granted patent’s term. See id.; see Princo Corp., 
616 F.3d at 1326.
275 See Christa J. Laser, Continuing the Conversation of “The Economic Irra­
tionality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine”, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 104, 207,
112 (2012) (criticizing patent misuse as an overdeterrent when it applies beyond
the scope of antitrust liability); see Dan Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1121–22 (2003) (analyzing legislative and doctrinal history
and concluding that “[s]omething less than the conduct necessary for an antitrust
tying violation might be sufficient for a finding of misuse . . . .”).
276 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); accord Mo­
tion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917)
(“[I]f sustained, it would be gravely injurious to that public interest, which we
have seen is more a favorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes.”).
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seek relief.277 Patent misuse only acts as a defense to infringement 
where the misuse is of the asserted patent.278 
1. STATUTORY SCOPE UNDER SECTIONS 282 AND 271(D) 
Although misuse is a derivative of unclean hands,279 unlike un­
clean hands, the doctrine of misuse was not unqualifiedly imputed 
into the text of the statute.280 In addition to codifying this doctrine 
in the defense of unenforceability, the 1952 Patent Act enumerated 
several circumstances that would not constitute misuse, providing: 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for in­
fringement or contributory infringement of a patent 
shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his 
having done one or more of the following: (1) de­
rived revenue from acts which if performed by an­
other without his consent would constitute contribu­
tory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or au­
thorized another to perform acts which if performed 
without his consent would constitute contributory in­
fringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his 
277 U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) 
(“[C]ourts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents to recover any 
of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter until the 
effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or ‘purged’ as the conventional say­
ing goes.”); Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 493 (“Equity may rightly withhold its 
assistance from such a use of the patent by declining to entertain a suit for in­
fringement, and should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper 
practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent
have been dissipated.”).
278 Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (find­
ing no misuse based on misrepresentations to the FTC noting that “the defense of
patent misuse is not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a patentee
engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even conduct that may 
have anticompetitive effects. As reprehensible as BMS’s actions may be, they do
not constitute patent misuse: ‘Where the patentee has not leveraged its patent be­
yond the scope of rights grant by the Patent Act, misuse has not been found.’”(in­
ternal quotations and citations omitted)). 
279 C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
280 See Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 271, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (1952) 
(current version at 35 U.S.C. § 271, § 282).
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pat-ent rights against infringement or contributory 
infringement.281 
In Section 271(c), Congress defined contributory infringement as 
follows: 
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United 
States or imports into the United States a component 
of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in 
practicing a patented process, constituting a material 
part of the invention, knowing the same to be espe­
cially made or especially adapted for use in an in­
fringement of such patent, and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer.282 
In the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, Congress added the fol­
lowing additional exceptions to misuse, arriving at the current ver­
sion of section 271(d): 
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; 
or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the pat­
ent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisi­
tion of a license to rights in another patent or pur­
chase of a separate product, unless, in view of the 
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in 
the relevant market for the patent or patented product 
on which the license or sale is conditioned.283 
281 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 271(d), 66 Stat. 792, 811 (1952) (current 
version at 35 U.S.C. § 271).
282 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
283 35 U.S.C. § 271(d). The statutory basis for misuse can also be said to arise
from section 271 under the statutory interpretive canon expressio unios, where the 
expression of one is the exclusion of another. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, 
at 107; see Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000). 
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The legislative history indicates that the 1988 amendment was made 
to add exceptions to misuse beyond what existed in common law at 
the time.284 
2. DECISIONAL LAW AT THE TIME OF ENACTMENT
A series of Supreme Court cases in the early twentieth century 
defines the scope of patent misuse as it existed prior to 1952, al­
though the statute abrogated findings of misuse under certain fact 
patterns seen in these cases.285 
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. stands for 
the principle that mere nonuse or exercise of the right to exclude 
others from uses within the scope of the patent is not misuse.286 In
Continental Paper Bag, a defendant in a patent infringement suit 
that was brought in equity (seeking an injunction and equitable ac­
counting) argued that equity should be denied because the patentee 
never made use of the patent other than to bring suit.287 Defendant 
argued that because under the Constitution, the purpose of intellec­
tual property is “[t]o promote the progress of science and the useful
arts,”288 a patent that is not used to make anything does not promote 
such progress, does not meet the public policy goals of patents, and 
should therefore not be enforced in a court of equity.289 
284 See S. REP. NO. 100-492, at 14 (1988) (“The lack of clarity and predicta­
bility in application of the patent misuse doctrine and that doctrine’s potential for 
impeding procompetitive arrangements are major causes for concern.”); 134
CONG. REC. 32,471 (1988) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“Reform of patent
misuse will ensure that the harsh misuse sanction of unenforceability is imposed 
only against those engaging in truly anticompetitive conduct.”); id. at 32,295 
(statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier) (“[T]he proposed modifications should
have a pro-competitive effect, insofar as they require some linkage between the 
patent licensing practice and anti-competitive conduct.”); Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204–207 (1980) (detailing legislative history of 
section 271). 
285 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 (1908). 
286 Id.
287 Id. at 406.
288 Id. at 422–24; U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have 
power . . . To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for lim­
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries . . . .”).
289 Cont’l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 422–24. 
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The Supreme Court in Continental Paper Bag disagreed that 
nonuse is contrary to the policy goal of patents, which the Court said 
is primarily “to promote disclosure” by requiring a description of 
the invention in exchange for a temporary right to exclude and stated 
that the statutory right “can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness 
by a prevention of its violation.”290 The Court also supported its 
holding with a statutory history analysis, noting that in 1836 Con­
gress repealed a law that required foreign persons to make use of the 
patent within a year or forfeit the right and that other countries had 
requirements of use, but Congress chose instead to only require dis­
closure in exchange for the right to exclude.291 The Court noted, 
however, that it did not decide whether a situation might arise where
“in view of the public interest, a court of equity might be justified in 
withholding relief by injunction . . . .”292 
In a series of cases after Continental Paper Bag, the Court fur­
ther delineated the proper scope of the patent grant by finding that 
certain uses outside the scope of the patent grant were not infringing 
uses, such as use of unpatented supplies despite that a patented ma­
chine was sold with a notice requiring purchase of supplies from the 
patentee.293 However, these cases arguably did not apply misuse as 
an affirmative defense to infringement; instead, they held that a li­
cense agreement’s restrictions beyond the patent’s scope were
290 Id. at 430. The Court also held that a patent does not make the patentee “a 
quasi-trustee for the public” by obligating the patentee to particular uses, but ra­
ther the public policy purpose of patents is “to induce a disclosure of” the inven­
tion in exchange for the right to exclude others from using what was disclosed 
until expiration of the patent term. Id. at 424. 
291 Id. at 424, 429.
292 Id. at 430.
293 See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 501 (1917) (finding
post-sale restriction upon purchasers of patented machine was invalid and there­
fore no suit could be brought in equity for violation of the terms of the restriction);
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917)
(finding license restriction void and therefore no infringement for uses that vio­
lated the restriction); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33–34 
(1931) (finding no contributory infringement where defendant sold an unpatented
staple article, dry ice, with knowledge that it would be used in patented equip­
ment); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (finding no con­
tributory infringement based on sale of unpatented staple article for use in pa­
tented process, but noting that “every use of a patent as a means of obtaining a
limited monopoly of unpatented material is prohibited . . . .”). 
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invalid or that the conduct did not amount to contributory patent in­
fringement rather than holding a patent infringed yet still unenforce­
able.294 These, therefore, cannot accurately be said to define the 
scope of the misuse doctrine as incorporated into the statutory text. 
In Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., the Supreme Court 
more clearly applied patent misuse as a defense to patent infringe­
ment.295 Morton Salt was a suit for direct patent infringement 
brought in equity.296 The patentee of a machine for depositing salt 
tablets into cans leased its machines to customers on the condition 
that its lessees purchase unpatented salt tablets from the patentee.297 
After a competitor began to sell an allegedly infringing machine, the
patentee brought suit against the competitor for direct infringe­
ment.298 The Supreme Court found that patentee’s conduct in tying 
the lease of a patented machine to the sale of salt tablets was “con­
trary to public policy.”299 The Court noted that courts, especially in 
equity, may deny relief “where the plaintiff is using the right as­
serted contrary to the public interest.”300 Therefore, the Court deter­
mined301 that even if the defendant’s use was infringing, the Court 
would not permit the patentee to obtain equitable relief for the in­
fringement until “the improper practice has been abandoned.”302 
294 See Straus, 243 U.S. at 501; Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 518; Carbice 
Corp., 283 U.S. at 33–34; Leitch Mfg. Co., 302 U.S. at 463. 
295 See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942).
296 See id. at 489–90 (seeking the equitable remedies of an injunction and ac­
counting). 
297 Id. at 490–91. 
298 Id.
299 Id. at 494.
300 Id. at 492 (citation omitted) (noting that a court of equity may in its discre­
tion withhold equitable relief in furtherance of the public interest, and providing
that “[i]n considering the propriety of the equitable relief granted here, we cannot
ignore the judgment of Congress . . . .”). To the extent that this statement was 
meant to extend the doctrine of misuse beyond equity, it was dicta. See id. at 492– 
93.
301 See also id. at 490 (“The question we must decide is . . . whether a court of
equity will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when respondent is using it
as the effective means of restraining competition with its sale of an unpatented
article.”).
302 Id. at 493 (“Equity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of
the patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and should do so at 
least until it is made to appear that the improper practice has been abandoned and 
that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated.”).
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Next, in B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Con­
tinent Investment Co. (“Mercoid I”), and Mercoid Corp. v. Minne­
apolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (“Mercoid II”), the Court further 
extended its punishment of tying arrangements as misuse, eventu­
ally spurring congressional intervention with the 1952 Patent Act.303 
In B.B. Chemical, the Court found that a patentee that derived reve­
nue for its patent by selling unpatented coated fabric especially 
made for use in its patented shoe-reinforcing method could not en­
force its patent in equity due to misuse.304 This extension reached a 
fever pitch in 1944 with Mercoid I and II, which held that a pat­
entee engaged in misuse and therefore had no remedy in equity be­
cause it calculated royalties owed for a patent on a furnace heating 
system based on sales of a specialized switch essential to the sys­
tem’s operation.305 The B.B. Chemical and the Mercoid I and II fact 
patterns no longer constitute misuse after the 1952 Patent Act and 
under section 271(d), which provides that it is not misuse to derive 
revenue from what would be contributory infringement if performed
by another.306 Contributory infringement would include the sale of 
a component of a patented invention or material for use in a patented 
process (like coated fabric307 for a shoe-reinforcing process308 or a 
303 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 213, 229, 236 
(1980) (noting that one purpose for legislation of 1952 Patent Act was to overrule 
the Mercoid I and II misuse rationale, which was previously supported in B.B. 
Chemical).
304 B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 496–98 (1942) (holding that even
if accused infringer actively induced infringement, suit was properly dismissed 
because patentee’s “use of the patent as the means of establishing a limited mo­
nopoly in its unpatented materials” was “contrary to public policy”). 
305 See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (Mercoid I), 320 U.S. 661,
666–68 (1944) (“That result obtains here though we assume for the purposes of
this case that Mercoid was a contributory infringer and that respondents could
have enjoined the infringement had they not misused the patent for the purpose of
monopolizing unpatented material.”); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co. (Mercoid II), 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944) (first citing Morton, 314 
U.S. at 494; and then citing B.B. Chem., 314 U.S. at 495) (“It likewise follows
that respondent may not obtain from a court of equity any decree which directly
or indirectly helps it to subvert the public policy which underlies the grant of its 
patent.”).
306 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).
 
307 B.B. Chem., 314 U.S. at, 496–98. 

308 Id.
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specialized switch for a furnace309), with knowledge that the com­
ponent or material is especially made or adapted for use in the pa­
tented invention, provided that it is not a staple article with a sub­
stantial non-infringing use.310 Indeed, the exceptions in section
271(d) were developed primarily to abrogate Mercoid I and II.311 
3. DOES MISUSE EXTEND INTO ACTIONS AT LAW? 
Prior to codification in 1952, the doctrine of patent misuse was 
only used to bar equitable relief. Although one case, Carbice Corp.
v. American Patents Development Corp. in 1931, denied a claim in 
equity that included a request for damages while using some of the 
language of misuse, this case only reversed a finding of contributory 
infringement rather than applying patent misuse to bar enforceabil­
ity of a patent found to be infringed.312 Specifically, the court of ap­
peals found that the sale of dry ice with the intent that it be used to 
infringe a patent on refrigerated packaging constituted contributory 
infringement, reversing the finding of the trial court.313 The trial 
court opinion notes that the defenses raised were invalidity and 
309 Mercoid I, 320 U.S. at 666–68. 
310 See id.
311 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 209–14 (1980)
(discussing legislative history of section 271(d) and noting “the legislative history 
reveals that § 271(d) was designed to retreat from Mercoid . . . .”).
312 Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 28, 31, 33–35
(1931) (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 515 (1917)) (“The limited monopoly to make, use, and vend an article may 
not be ‘expanded by limitations as to materials and supplies necessary to the op­
eration of it.’”). Although Carbice was mentioned in hearings on misuse reform
prior to the passage of the 1952 Patent Act, these hearings sought to balance the
doctrines of contributory infringement and misuse, so the hearings considered
both cases, and the distinction between a finding of no contributory infringement
and a finding of misuse was not material in that context, as it is here to the law 
and equity distinction. A Bill to Prove for the Protection of Patent Rights Where 
Enforcement Against Direct Infringement is Impracticable, to Define “Contribu­
tory Infringement,” and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 3866 Before the S.
Comm. No. 4 on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 67 (1949) (statement of Giles Rich)
(“The exception which we wish to make to the misuse doctrine would reverse the 
result in the Mercoid case; it would not reverse the result in the Carbice case.”). 
313 Am. Patents Dev. Corp. v. Carbice Corp., 38 F.2d 62, 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(rejecting argument made in reliance on Motion Picture “that [defendant] did not
infringe”), rev’d, 283 U.S. 27 (1931). 
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noninfringement, with no mention of misuse.314 Given that misuse
was not raised below and that the decision that was reversed was for
a finding of contributory infringement, not a finding of no misuse,315 
Carbice cannot be said to be a case defining the misuse defense. In 
every other case discussed above, the Supreme Court only denied 
equitable relief.316 
In Morton Salt, the Court linked the misuse doctrine to one that 
requires those seeking relief in equity to have “clean hands” and re­
peatedly referenced principles of equity and the unique considera­
tions when granting equitable relief as the basis for its holding.317 
Mercoid I, likewise, based its holding on the unique considerations 
of equitable relief.318 Yet, misuse does not involve fraud in the for­
mation of an instrument or fraud in obtaining a judgment at law, so 
314 Am. Patents Dev. Corp. v. Carbice Corp., 25 F.2d 730, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 
1928) (“Defendant offers the defenses of invalidity and noninfringement.”), rev’d, 
38 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1930), rev’d, 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
315 Carbice Corp., 283 U.S. at 30, 33. 
316 See B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942). In B.B. Chemical, 
a case discussed above, the Court rejected the patentee’s final plea to avoid dis­
missal, which was to offer the infringer a royalty-based license, but this was of­
fered to undermine the finding of misuse rather than as an alternative award of
relief from the court, and the case was solely brought in equity seeking equitable
relief. See id.
317 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492–94 (1942) (link­
ing patent misuse to the equitable doctrine of “clean hands” and noting “[e]quity
may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the patent . . . .”); see also
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 186 (1980) (“petition­
ers . . . raise as their only defense to liability the contention that respondent, by 
engaging in patent misuse, comes into court with unclean hands”); id. at 193 (not­
ing that Morton Salt “explicitly linked the doctrine of patent misuse to the ‘un­
clean hands’ doctrine traditionally applied by courts of equity”); C.R. Bard, Inc. 
v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no misuse but
noting in dicta that “[t]he defense of patent misuse arises from the equitable doc­
trine of unclean hands . . . . Patent misuse arises in equity, and a holding of misuse 
renders the patent unenforceable until the misuse is purged; it does not, of itself, 
invalidate the patent.”).
318 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (Mercoid I), 320 U.S. 661, 669 
(1944) (citing Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942)) (“It is sufficient to say that
in whatever posture the issue may be tendered courts of equity will withhold relief 
where the patentee and those claiming under him are using the patent privilege
contrary to the public interest.”). Id. at 665 (“The Court has repeatedly held that 
to allow such suits would be to extend the aid of a court of equity in expanding
the patent beyond the legitimate scope of its monopoly.”). 
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it would not fall within the narrow category of unclean hands de­
fenses that acted to bar legal relief such as damages prior to codifi­
cation.319 
After 1952, no Supreme Court case has upheld a finding of mis­
use.320 In light of the pre-1952 caselaw, a court applying a traditional 
approach would likely not use patent misuse to bar a claim for dam­
ages at law, even if only temporarily while the conduct persists. The 
traditional approach would likewise caution that misuse should not 
be read as an “all-purpose claim against patent enforcement,” but 
should instead be limited to the scope of the doctrine as it was ap­
plied prior to 1952, with modifications to comply with the additional 
statutory exceptions in section 271(d).321 A dynamic approach, in 
contrast, would allow courts to extend misuse beyond its pre-codi­
fication roots to bar all remedies, including damages at law where 
the court deems it appropriate. 
III. ANALYSIS
A.	 Dynamic vs. Traditional Approaches: Constitutional 
Authority 
Some scholars urge courts to institute a complete merger of law 
and equity whereby all equitable defenses are available to bar all 
legal claims, arguing that barriers should not be maintained merely
because we are blindly following a “historical accident.”322 Those 
319 Supra Part II.B.
320 See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43, 46 (2006)
(vacating and remanding for a determination of whether the patentee’s conduct
was anticompetitive); Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 223 (finding no misuse). 
321 Burk, supra note 275, at 1117 n.126 (noting that, in recent years, misuse 
has often been invoked “as a low-cost substitute for antitrust analysis” and came 
to be viewed “as a bargain-basement, all-purpose claim against patent enforce­
ment”).
322 T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-Merger Justification 
of Unclean Hands, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455, 478, 509 (2008); see Douglas Laycock,
The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53–54 (1993) (“The war
between law and equity is over. Equity won. . . . Except where references to eq­
uity have been codified, as in the constitutional guarantees of jury trial, we should
consider it wholly irrelevant whether a remedy, procedure, or doctrine originated
at law or in equity.”); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., Foreword to SELECTED ESSAYS
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using a traditional approach might hold that these arguments lack
sway in the context of statutory equitable defenses like in patent law, 
where it was Congress, not “historical accident,” that determined 
how those doctrines should apply.323 Moreover, Congress made a 
choice to codify and stabilize the doctrines as they existed at a par­
ticular point in time.324 
Under the traditional approach to equitable defenses, courts ap­
plying equity in patent law would look to history at the time of en­
actment of the Patent Act of 1952 to determine the availability of 
equitable defenses to legal claims.325 Courts should begin by deter­
mining whether the equitable doctrine at issue is imputed into the
text of a statutory provision by reference, such as the unenforceabil­
ity defense available under section 282 of the Patent Act. If so, 
courts should examine the scope of decisional law to determine 
whether expansion of the doctrine would go beyond what was un­
derstood under the language of the statute at the time of enactment. 
If an application of an equitable doctrine does not either arise under 
the statute as it was understood at the time of enactment or arise 
from established decisional law at the time of enactment, courts 
should be mindful to avoid extending the doctrine in a way that 
would exceed its statutory and historical roots. 
Under a traditional approach, courts should respect Congress’s
choice to use a common term with a defined meaning, in part be­
cause they lack the constitutional authority to further expand 
ON EQUITY iii–iv (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) (It would be “absurd for us to go on 
until the year 2000 obliging judges and lawyers to climb over a barrier which was 
put up by historical accident in 14th century England . . . .”). 
323 Laycock, supra note 322, at 53–54 (noting exceptions to the argument in
favor of substantive merger “where references to equity have been codified, as in
the constitutional guarantees of jury trial . . . .”). 
324 See Federico, supra note 27, at 166 (noting the goal of the 1952 Patent Act
to codify, stabilize, and modify decisional law doctrines); Dawson Chem. Co., 
448 U.S. at 180 (“[I]n its 1952 codification of the patent laws Congress endeav­
ored, at least in part, to substitute statutory precepts for the general judicial rules 
that had governed prior to that time.”). 
325 See Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 180 (“[I]n its 1952 codification of the 
patent laws Congress endeavored, at least in part, to substitute statutory precepts
for the general judicial rules that had governed prior to that time.”).
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statutory law.326 According to a traditional argument, the Constitu­
tion vested the power to make law “in a Congress,” not the courts.327 
This is particularly true in patent law, where the Constitution pro­
vides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries . . . .”328 The power to determine the policy goals of pat­
ents lies with Congress.329 By cabining equitable doctrines to the
scope as they existed when the patent statutes incorporated them,
courts abide by the policy balance struck by Congress and avoid 
readings that run contrary to the statutory rights of patentees to 
“have remedy by civil action for infringement of [their] pa­
tent[s].”330 Moreover, incorporating the version of the law as it was 
understood at the time of enactment, rather than allowing courts to 
develop law beyond the scope of what was enacted, complies with 
constitutional principles of separation of powers and nondelega­
tion.331 The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States”332 
and the Supreme Court has “long . . . insisted that ‘the integrity and 
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitu­
tion’ mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative 
326 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a 
House of Representatives.”). 
327 Id.
328 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To pro­
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis­
coveries . . . .”).
329 SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“Policy arguments 
are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court.”); see also Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 523, 526 (1987) (“Deciding what competing values will 
or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very 
essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative 
intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objec­
tive must be the law.”). 
330 35 U.S.C. § 281. 
331 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
371–72 (1989) (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). 
332 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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power to another Branch.”333 In the event of changed circumstances
justifying a change in the law, those who accept the more historical 
approach would argue that it is the role of Congress, not that of the 
courts, to amend the law.334 
In contrast, those adopting a more dynamic approach, one that 
permits development of the law after codification, would argue that 
the broad term “unenforceability” leaves significant gaps for courts 
to fill in the contours of the doctrine and adapt it over time. By using
broad language, Congress could have anticipated that courts would 
further hone the body of common law as courts had done in the years 
prior. Moreover, the flexible approach allows equitable defenses to 
retain their equitable nature, which might have been intended by 
Congress when it referred to the doctrine of unenforceability. Under 
a dynamic approach, one might also raise concern that an approach 
to statutory interpretation that depends upon the meaning at enact­
ment is unrealistic because Congress cannot possibly foresee all fu­
ture circumstances where policy might justify an expansion of cur­
rent law. 
B. Policy Considerations 
Many scholars argue that patent law “is a common law enabling 
statute”335 that gives power to courts to set various “policy levers” 
of patent law.336 The policy justifications given in the scholarship 
for a dynamic approach include the following: Courts are better 
suited than Congress to determine the policy needs of patents be­
cause they have closer knowledge of the impact of those decisions 
on litigants.337 The sometimes irreconcilable differences between 
competing interests in patent law, such as between technology and 
pharmaceutical industry groups, can make attempts at reform in a
333 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72 (quoting Field, 143 U.S. at 692 (1892)).
334 See id. 
335 Nard, supra note 8, at 53; see Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 801. 
336 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1668 (2003).
337 Nard, supra note 8, at 55–56 (“[T]he patent system is best served when the
reform-minded engage patent law’s traditional policy driver – the judici­
ary . . . .The judge, in the Hayekian sense, is closer to the ‘inside baseball’ dy­
namic that is unique to each of the divergent industries that participate in the pa­
tent system . . . .[T]he common law is more likely to develop doctrine that reflects 
an industry’s legitimate expectations.”). 
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body that requires consensus, such as Congress, nearly impossi­
ble.338 The level of nuance and adaptability required for patent pol­
icy to be optimally balanced can be achieved within a more reason­
able timeframe and at a lower cost by courts than by specific rules 
set out by Congress.339 Moreover, Congress lacks the staff hours to 
fully assess the policy impact of legislation on complex issues like 
patent law, particularly in any kind of agile manner capable of re­
sponding to the latest technological changes and legal and societal 
norms.340 
In contrast, those supporting a traditional approach341 would 
raise competing arguments for Congress’s institutional advantage
on matters of policy. First, courts can make uninformed policy de­
cisions because they lack the resources that are uniquely available 
to lawmakers for determining policy.342 Although Congress may 
hear commentary from diverse stakeholders as to how the laws will 
affect them, call hearings to ask stakeholders questions, negotiate 
consensus between industries, and commission social science or 
economics studies and await their results before acting,343 a judge 
often has far less information available and must act timely on the
case before her regardless of whether she has a full picture of the
policy implications. Although gridlock can slow the pace of legisla­
tion and result in law that is unable to adapt to changing circum­
stances, the benefit of consolidation of many competing interests is
lost when a court chooses the law to suit the equities of only the 
parties in a dispute. A judge might, in the worst case, substitute her 
own reasoning for careful policy decisions on issues covered by stat­
ute. 
338 See Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 801 (“[R]ecent attempts at reform show
that rent seeking by particular technological interests thwarts the adoption of
sound rules.”). 
339 Burk & Lemley, supra note 336, at 1668. 
340 See Anna Hensel, Congress Lacks Tech Knowledge to Properly Question
Google CEO Sundbar Pichai, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 11, 2018), https://venture­
beat.com/2018/12/11/congress-lacks-tech-knowledge-to-properly-question­
google-ceo-sundar-pichai/.
341 See Manning, supra note 7, at 5.
342 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 336, at 1669.
343 See The Legislative Branch, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
about-the-white-house/the-legislative-branch/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
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Particularly in patent law, where appellate jurisdiction is placed 
exclusively before a single federal circuit, the opportunities to gather
information on policy making and consider the impact of alternative 
decisions is limited.344 Without other circuit courts to develop and 
test alternative approaches to the law, the federal circuit lacks suffi­
cient information to gauge the potential impact of different legal 
choices.345 Moreover, where the law develops in a lone federal cir­
cuit, rules set forth in prior cases often calcify to the point that the
federal circuit is unlikely to change them without Supreme Court 
intervention—an environment that is not well-suited to agile policy­
making.346 In contrast, leaving policy decisions to Congress ensures 
that voters have accountable representation of their policy interests 
and limits politicization of the judiciary.347 
Second, modern courts are typically (and appropriately) unwill­
ing to make affirmative policy decisions.348 Courts’ unwillingness 
to engage in affirmative policy making may result in unintentional
policy if, for example, the needs of a case require gap-filling on the 
scope of a law that ultimately implicates policy concerns. Moreover, 
unintentional policy is often incorrect policy because it lacks the
considerations of how rules impact the rights of those outside the
case at hand.349 Modern courts base decisions chiefly on precedent 
and interpretation of law, appropriately limiting their decisions to 
the case at hand as much as possible, rather than basing decisions on 
a thorough consideration of the policy interests of stakeholders 
344 See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uni­
formity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1632 (2007) (arguing that single 
Federal Circuit limits generation of ideas for legal decision-making around patent
law).
345 See id.
346 See id. at 1644. 
347 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at xxiii, xxvii. 
348 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC,
137 S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017) (“[W]e cannot overrule Congress’s judgment based on
our own policy views.”). In the last few decades, courts have returned to a textu­
alist approach to statutory interpretation. See Laser, The Scope of IPR Estoppel, 
supra note 84, at 1137–38 (discussing modern trends toward textualism and its 
impact on statutory interpretation of patent law). This trend will likely continue
further given the makeup of the Court as of 2020.
349 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 336, at 1669 (arguing that courts tend to 
get patent policy decisions wrong when they “wash their hands of involvement in
the calibration of policy”). 
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outside the litigation and eye toward consensus building between 
those interests.350 Patent law in particular is not one of those areas
of law where the Supreme Court typically engages in standard-set­
ting based on policy—indeed, the Supreme Court often takes a tex­
tualist approach to patent law.351 Particularly, as to the scope of eq­
uitable defenses to patents, which have immense power in a lawsuit 
to wipe out the entirety of a judgment if applied at law, those sup­
porting a traditional approach would argue that the policy decisions
of patent law require a deliberate, affirmative stance that courts are 
often unable and appropriately unwilling to provide.352 
Third, those arguing in favor of a traditional approach would 
urge that the slow pace and requirement for consensus and codifica­
tion of the law into text promotes certainty and predictability in the
law. A single court decision can change in an instant what patent 
stakeholders believe to be the law, rendering issued patents subject 
to invalidation and in some cases, undermining the viability of entire 
industries that relied upon the prior legal regime.353 Although legis­
lation can also have this effect, it does so at a slower pace that ena­
bles key stakeholders to engage with policy makers and allows leg­
islators to attempt to build consensus between competing industries’ 
interests, often with review and comment upon drafts of bills as they 
will be passed.354 In contrast, litigants often do not know and cannot 
predict exactly what standards courts will adopt to apply the law in 
particular cases when a novel issue arises—until the opinion issues, 
the precise articulation of the standard will be unknown to the pub­
lic. Moreover, because court decisions can change through review
by higher courts or by modification of a doctrine in the next case in 
response to different facts, standards set forth by courts are less sta­
ble than laws passed by Congress. Certainty is important to patent 
law in particular because if patentees and those who practice inven­
tions cannot determine with reasonable certainty whether and what 
350 See  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT 4–5 (1999) (advocating for “judicial minimalism” whereby 
courts limit the scope of their decision to the case at hand). 
351 See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018).
 
352 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 967.
 
353 See Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Pa­
tent Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 939, 939 (2017). 
354 See The Legislative Branch, supra note 343.
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remedies will be available for infringement of patents, it changes 
assessments of the values and risks of investing in patenting and 
product development.355 The more certainty that courts and lawmak­
ers can provide to innovators as to whether and what type of relief a 
patentee can obtain for infringement, what behaviors will be deemed
inequitable, and what effect those behaviors will have on the right 
to recovery, the more investments in innovation will be respected 
today and incentivized tomorrow. Parties can still mitigate risk of 
uncertainty under a dynamic interpretive regime, but it requires, at 
a minimum, that courts are predictable about which method they 
will use and the principles that govern its application. 
C. Alternative Actions by Congress 
There is an alternative way for Congress to address the concern
that a static approach to statutory interpretation fails to account for
changing circumstances: If tailored to limit conflict with the non-
delegation doctrine, Congress could provide, by the text of a statute, 
that the courts or an administrative agency may continue to develop 
defenses or standards for applying a doctrine within the contours
laid out in the statute.356 The Supreme Court has held that Congress 
may delegate determinations of details of a law provided that Con­
gress sets forth the contours and policy guidelines and identifies 
which body will develop those details.357 
In practice, Congress frequently delegates some authority to 
agencies when the details of a law might need to change with
355 See supra Part III.B.
356 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2139 (2005) (arguing that statutes can be tailored by
their text to be decided according to different interpretive principles). Under the
nondelegation doctrine, Congress may not delegate lawmaking authority to an­
other branch without “‘lay[ing] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to 
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’” Whitman 
v. American Trucking Ass’n., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). This flows from the 
Constitution placing “[a]ll legislative Powers . . . in a Congress of the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
357 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (“[T]his Court has 
deemed it ‘constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated 
authority.’”). One might question whether this is consistent with the nondelega­
tion doctrine. See id. 
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changed circumstances, including in intellectual property stat­
utes.358 For example, in the section of the copyright statute that pro­
vides that it is unlawful to attempt to circumvent a technological 
measure that is designed to prevent copyright infringement, Con­
gress delegated the ability to set forth, every three years, particular 
exceptions to this rule to account for changes in technology and so­
cietal needs.359 Congress could delegate authority to an agency to 
address the impact of changing technologies on the proper scope of 
defenses, provided that the delegation includes sufficient guidance 
to limit conflicts with the nondelegation doctrine.360 For example, 
the Federal Trade Commission could be tasked with setting forth
what uses of a patent would be deemed contrary to the public interest 
under a misuse analysis, akin to what the Copyright Office sets forth 
with regard to exceptions to anti-circumvention rules.361 Alterna­
tively, Congress could provide that the Patent Office set forth stand­
ards for what constitutes fraud in obtaining a patent.362 
Congress can use words that give broader or narrower authority 
to courts to determine the reach of the law.363 For example, the Sher­
man Act provides that conduct “in restraint of trade” is illegal, with­
out defining this term.364 Many urge that this statute delegated au­
thority to courts to determine which conduct leads to a particular 
economic consequence, which might differ over time365—others 
might say this authority is inconsistent with nondelegation.366 In pat­
ent law’s equitable defenses, those arguing for a dynamic approach 
might say that Congress’s broad general language was a delegation 
358 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (enabling the Librarian of Congress to set
forth, every three years, a set of circumstances under which individuals will be 
exempt from the prohibition in the statute on circumventions of technological ac­
cess limitations on copyrighted works). 
359 See id.
 
360 See id. 

361 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
 
362 See Duffy, supra note 237, at 448 (“[A]gency policing of administrative
 
misconduct would be more stable, predictable, and reliable than the current sys­
tem of after-the-fact evaluations . . . conducted by the courts.”). 
363 See Rosenkranz, supra note 356, at 2139. 
364 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
365 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Stat­
utes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 429 (2008). 
366 See id. at 461. 
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to courts to continue to develop the law.367 In contrast, those arguing 
for an imputed common law approach would say that when Con­
gress used the term “unenforceability,” with an established history
in decisional law, it limited the power of courts to act contrary to 
those boundaries.368 Nevertheless, even words that carry boundaries 
imputed from common law do not block the inherent power of 
courts to apply the law by assessing whether a new situation falls
within prior boundaries. Ultimately, the reach of equitable defenses
comes down to a statutory interpretive choice and Congress has not 
instructed courts on which method they should apply in patent law. 
CONCLUSION
Equity in patent litigation is a high-stakes game, where equitable
defenses such as unclean hands and misuse have the capacity to ren­
der multi-million-dollar patent infringement verdicts unenforceable 
if these defenses are interpreted to bar remedies at law. Although 
equity is often thought to be a flexible doctrine that courts have dis­
cretion to extend,369 when equitable doctrines are codified into a 
statute, significant interpretive questions arise as to whether and
how courts’ application of equity is constrained by imputed law. Un­
der a faithful agent approach, equitable defenses would not be ex­
tended beyond the boundaries existing in the common law at enact­
ment. Under a dynamic approach, courts would share the duty to 
update and expand the law of equitable defenses, and perhaps even 
their reach into actions at law, in accordance with the social and le­
gal norms in place at the time a case is decided. The facts and pro­
cedural history of one case might align with a historical nuance in 
one instance, even when history or policy, depending on the ap­
proach used, would not support extension of the same rule in an­
other. Until the Supreme Court provides guidance, lower courts will 
need to consider not only the equities of a particular case but also
historical, normative, and constitutional considerations to decide on 
an appropriate interpretive method and outcome. This Article pro­
vides the battle map to guide such considerations.
367 See Nard, supra note 8, at 53.
 
368 See Manning, supra note 7, at 5–6.
 
369 See Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 

FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 25 (1951).
